2025年中國房價跌幅榜：哪些城市跌得最慘？北上廣深還撐得住嗎？

中國房地產市場正處於歷史性的深度調整期，2025年全國多個城市房價出現劇烈下跌，不僅三四線城市首當其衝，就連一線城市也難以全身而退。本文將深入分析房價跌幅最慘的城市類型、一線城市的抗跌能力，以及整體市場下行對宏觀經濟的深遠影響。

2025年，跌幅最為明顯的多集中在中西部與東北地區的三四線城市，這些地方長期以來依賴炒作與過度供應支撐房價，如今在人口外流、經濟乏力、庫存高企等因素共同作用下，價格出現「雪崩式」下滑。以成都天府新區為例，作為前幾年最受熱捧的開發區之一，房價自高點回落超過五成，許多專案出現「腰斬」，空置率飆升；而鄭州則因爛尾樓頻發、地方財政緊張，加上河南村鎮銀行危機影響市場信心，導致二手房均價較2021年高點下跌超過四成。

其他如武漢、南京，雖作為二線強省會城市，依靠政策紅利曾一度吸引大量人口與投資，但在產業升級不力、高薪崗位缺乏、房地產供過於求等因素影響下，房價同樣承壓。部分郊區新盤大幅打折促銷，實際成交價較高峰期下降三成以上。天津則因長期經濟增長乏力，主城區人口流失嚴重，房價出現緩慢但持續的陰跌。而東北與西部的洛陽、昆明、長春等城市，則在經濟結構老化與投資信心潰散之下，呈現「有價無市」的尷尬局面，跌幅普遍在兩至四成之間。

即便是北上廣深這類傳統一線城市，在高利率、高槓桿環境下，也難以完全抵擋下行壓力。2025至2026年間，北京、上海雖因核心地段資源稀缺仍具抗跌能力，但通州、臨港等周邊新區的房價已現5%至10%的回調。廣州與深圳則受到產業外移與高端人才流失影響，總體房價跌幅可能達到15%。此外，房貸利率長期居高、收入預期下降（特別是互聯網與金融業裁員潮）、加上房產稅試點預期，使得購房與投資雙雙轉趨謹慎。

展望2027年以後，一線城市的房價走勢將出現明顯分化。核心地段如北京海淀、上海內環一帶，因教育、醫療、資源集中，仍具保值與溫和回升潛力；而遠郊新區如增城、龍崗等地，則因交通配套落後、空置率高，仍有持續陰跌風險。同時，隨著保租房等保障性住房的大量供應，普通住宅的租金收益率可能進一步走低，降低房地產的投資吸引力。

這場房地產下行也深刻地影響著中國整體經濟運行。首先是地方政府財政壓力劇增，土地出讓收入大幅萎縮，多地流拍率超過五成，原本依賴「賣地養城」的模式正逐步瓦解。部分地方政府透過城投平台高槓桿舉債，如今面臨債務違約風險。其次是金融體系承壓，銀行壞帳率上升，尤其是中小銀行受到開發貸、按揭貸違約影響，風險暴露加劇。此外，信託與非標理財產品曾大量為房企輸血，現在面臨無法兌付的危機，形成影子銀行風險。連帶的還有建材、家電、家居等上下游產業出現銷售下滑與產能過剩，造成建築業失業潮與中介業景氣低迷，許多依附房地產生存的中產與藍領階層遭受重創。財富效應消失，影響消費信心與家庭支出，對經濟成長造成壓力。根據部分研究機構估算，房地產下行可能對2025年GDP增速造成0.5至1個百分點的拖累。

面對這場結構性調整，政策如何引導市場「軟著陸」成為關鍵。中國政府一方面計劃投入萬億級資金，推動保障房、城中村改造與平急兩用設施的「三大工程」，試圖穩定住建投資與就業；另一方面，也逐步鬆綁限購，並透過下調房貸利率等手段穩定市場預期。但無論政策如何呵護，市場出清的過程仍難避免。部分資金鏈斷裂的中小開發商或將被淘汰，行業集中度有望進一步提升；而房價與收入比的調整也將是必經之路，如北京、上海的房價收入比已從巔峰時期的40倍下降至20倍出頭，更趨合理。這場調整也是中國經濟轉型的試金石。中國政府正試圖降低對房地產的依賴，轉向高端製造、數位經濟與綠色科技等新動能，但短期陣痛難以避免，特別是在就業、金融與地方財政方面仍需精準調控，以防範系統性風險的擴大。

總結來說，2025年的中國房地產市場，正在走出過去二十年「高槓桿＋高周轉」的泡沫路徑，邁入「挤泡沫、穩基本、促轉型」的新階段。核心城市的優質資產仍具長期價值，但非核心區域的房價可能長期低迷。未來真正的挑戰，是如何在泡沫破裂過程中避免硬著陸，並在調整中孕育出新的經濟增長引擎。這不僅是對市場的考驗，更是對中國經濟體制改革能力的全面檢驗。

China’s 2025 Property Price Crash: Which Cities Were Hit the Hardest? Can Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen Still Hold the Line?

China’s real estate market is undergoing a historic and deep structural adjustment. In 2025, numerous cities across the country experienced sharp property price declines. While third- and fourth-tier cities were the first to be hit, even the top-tier metropolises could not escape unscathed. This article will examine which types of cities saw the steepest drops, whether first-tier cities can resist the downturn, and how this market decline is affecting the broader economy.

The most significant price drops in 2025 were concentrated in third- and fourth-tier cities across central-western and northeastern China. These cities had long relied on speculation and excessive supply to prop up home prices, but now face plunging values due to population outflow, sluggish economic performance, and high housing inventory. For example, Chengdu’s Tianfu New Area—once a red-hot development zone—saw prices fall more than 50% from their peak. Many projects were “halved,” and vacancy rates soared. Zhengzhou faced similar troubles, with unfinished construction projects, local fiscal strains, and the fallout from the Henan rural bank scandal shaking market confidence. As a result, secondhand home prices in the city dropped over 40% from their 2021 peak.

Other cities like Wuhan and Nanjing, although strong provincial capitals, also came under pressure due to weak industrial upgrades, a lack of high-paying jobs, and excess housing supply. In some suburban areas, developers slashed prices to attract buyers, with actual sale prices down more than 30% from their highs. Tianjin, burdened by years of stagnant economic growth and significant population loss in its urban core, saw slow but consistent price erosion. Cities like Luoyang, Kunming, and Changchun in the northeast and western regions were plagued by “no market despite having prices,” with price declines typically ranging from 20% to 40%, driven by outdated industrial structures and collapsing investment confidence.

Even the top-tier cities—Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen—faced downward pressure amid high interest rates and heavy leverage. From 2025 into 2026, although central areas in Beijing and Shanghai still held their value due to resource scarcity, surrounding districts like Tongzhou and Lingang began to see price corrections of 5% to 10%. Guangzhou and Shenzhen were more affected by industrial relocation and the outflow of high-end talent, with overall price drops possibly reaching 15%. On top of this, persistently high mortgage rates, lowered income expectations—especially in the internet and finance sectors—and anticipated property tax pilot programs caused both buyers and investors to become more cautious.

Looking ahead to 2027 and beyond, property prices in first-tier cities are expected to diverge. Prime areas like Beijing’s Haidian District or Shanghai’s inner ring will likely retain value and see modest recovery due to concentrations of education, healthcare, and public resources. In contrast, far-flung suburban areas such as Zengcheng and Longgang may continue to slide due to weak transport infrastructure and high vacancy rates. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of government-subsidized rental housing is likely to drag down rental yields in ordinary residential units, further diminishing real estate’s investment appeal.

This real estate downturn is also deeply impacting China’s broader economy. First, local governments are under immense fiscal strain. Land sale revenues have plummeted, with more than half of land auctions going unsold in many regions. The “sell land to build cities” model is collapsing. Many local governments had used urban investment vehicles to raise funds through high leverage, and now face rising risks of default.

Second, the financial sector is under pressure. Non-performing loan ratios are rising, particularly at smaller banks exposed to defaulting development loans and mortgages. Trust and non-standard wealth management products—once used to funnel money to developers—are now facing redemption crises, heightening shadow banking risks.

Industries tied to real estate, such as construction materials, appliances, and furniture, are also seeing falling sales and overcapacity, leading to job losses in construction and a depressed brokerage industry. Many middle- and working-class households, whose livelihoods were tied to real estate, have been hit hard. The resulting loss of wealth effect is dampening consumer confidence and household spending, placing further pressure on economic growth. According to some research institutions, the property downturn could shave 0.5 to 1 percentage point off China’s 2025 GDP growth.

Navigating a "soft landing" amid this structural shift is critical. The Chinese government has launched three major initiatives—affordable housing, urban village redevelopment, and emergency-use infrastructure—backed by trillions of yuan in investment to stabilize real estate investment and employment. Meanwhile, restrictions on home purchases are gradually being eased, and mortgage rates are being lowered to stabilize market expectations.

However, no matter how carefully policies are crafted, a market clearing process is inevitable. Some small and medium-sized developers with broken capital chains will likely be forced out, and the industry will become more consolidated. Adjustments in the house price-to-income ratio are also underway—for instance, in Beijing and Shanghai, the ratio has already fallen from over 40 times at the peak to just above 20, a more reasonable level.

Ultimately, this adjustment serves as a litmus test for China’s broader economic transformation. The government is trying to reduce reliance on real estate and pivot toward new growth engines like high-end manufacturing, digital economy, and green technology. But short-term pain is inevitable, especially in areas like employment, finance, and local fiscal management, which require precise policy calibration to prevent systemic risks from spreading.

In summary, China’s property market in 2025 is transitioning away from the past two decades’ high-leverage, high-turnover boom toward a new phase focused on deleveraging, stabilization, and transformation. While prime assets in core cities may retain long-term value, prices in non-core areas may remain subdued for years. The true challenge lies in how to avoid a hard landing during the bubble’s collapse—and how to foster new engines of growth amid the turbulence. This is not just a test for the housing market, but for the resilience and adaptability of China’s entire economic reform agenda.