香港地鐵（港鐵，MTR）與中國內地的地鐵系統，雖同為城市軌道交通，但在經營模式、營收結構與城市規劃邏輯上存在顯著差異，導致港鐵常年錄得數十至上百億港元的淨利潤，而中國大多數城市地鐵卻面臨持續虧損、依賴政府補貼維持營運。這背後的關鍵，在於港鐵「鐵路 + 物業」的盈利模式，以及其高效的商業化運營體系。

首先來看票價本身。港鐵的票價在全球來看屬中高檔次。例如從港島的中環到新界東沙田，單程票價約為13至16港元不等，換算成人民幣約為12至15元；而在內地，同樣的通勤距離，例如北京、廣州、深圳等城市，票價可能僅需5至7元人民幣。港鐵票價相對較高，原因包括電費、人工成本、維修開支與資本回報率等考慮皆納入票價計算模型。而內地地鐵則屬「民生導向」，多採用低票價策略，設有上限封頂，並受政府價格管制，即使營運成本上升，也難以調整票價獲利。

然而，港鐵之所以能年年賺錢，關鍵不在於票價，而是在於「鐵路帶動地產、地產反哺鐵路」的閉環盈利模式。港鐵並非單純靠賣車票維生，而是透過與政府合作，在興建地鐵新線時同時獲得地鐵沿線的土地發展權。這些土地往往尚未開發或位處新市鎮邊緣，港鐵以地價成本取得後進行規劃、開發商業與住宅項目，再透過出售單位、出租商場、管理物業等方式獲得龐大利潤。例如九龍站上蓋的「圓方」商場與豪宅群，將地鐵站打造成一個集交通、住宅、辦公、消費於一體的多功能城市核心。這些房地產收入與租金回報，是港鐵財務報表中最強勁的收入來源。

據統計，港鐵近年每年來自「物業發展及租賃」的收入可達數十億港元，有些年份甚至超過票務本業的營收。單是出租車站內商舖與廣告空間，也是一筆穩定而可觀的收入來源。以銅鑼灣站、中環站等高人流樞紐為例，商舖租金每平方呎可達數千港元，等同核心商業區的街舖價位。

此外，港鐵亦積極參與境外市場，如北京、深圳、英國倫敦、澳洲雪梨等地的地鐵項目經營與顧問服務，拓展國際營運收益，形成多元化盈利結構。而香港本地亦有政府授權的鐵路工程管理收益，如新建屯馬線、南港島線等工程帶來的項目管理收入，也成為其帳面盈利來源之一。

相比之下，中國內地的地鐵普遍由地方政府或市政平台主導修建與運營，土地開發與地鐵部門多數分屬不同體系。例如地鐵公司不參與地上物業開發，也無法分享因地鐵通車而升值的土地收益，導致「鐵建歸地鐵、地產歸房企」，軌道交通部門無法建立正向資金迴圈，只能依靠財政撥款或補貼度日。加上內地地鐵通常以造福民生為核心，票價低廉、免費或半價群體眾多，營收難以覆蓋高昂運營與維修支出，財務壓力自然不斷累積。

簡言之，港鐵之所以能賺錢，是因為它不是單純的交通企業，而是城市空間資源整合者與房地產開發商的結合體。其營收模式遠超過車票本身，靠的是土地政策與城市規劃配合下所打造的高效資本運作系統。而中國內地若要複製港鐵經驗，則需解決部門分割、土地資源分配與資金機制缺位等深層體制問題。否則，在「票價難漲、成本難降」的現實下，虧損仍將是常態。

Hong Kong's Mass Transit Railway (MTR) and mainland China’s metro systems, while both forms of urban rail transit, differ significantly in their operational models, revenue structures, and urban planning logic. These differences have led to a stark contrast in financial outcomes: the MTR has consistently reported annual net profits in the tens to hundreds of millions of Hong Kong dollars, while most mainland metro systems operate at a loss, heavily reliant on government subsidies. The key lies in the MTR's "Rail + Property" business model and its highly efficient commercial operations.

To begin with, MTR fares are relatively high by global standards. For example, a single journey from Central on Hong Kong Island to Sha Tin in the New Territories costs around HKD 13 to 16, equivalent to roughly RMB 12 to 15. In contrast, a commute of similar distance in mainland cities like Beijing, Guangzhou, or Shenzhen might cost only RMB 5 to 7. The higher fares in Hong Kong reflect a pricing model that incorporates electricity, labor costs, maintenance, and capital return expectations. Mainland metro fares, however, are driven by public welfare goals, often capped by regulation, and rarely adjusted despite rising operational costs.

However, the real reason MTR consistently turns a profit is not the farebox revenue but its closed-loop "rail drives property, property funds rail" model. MTR is far more than just a ticket seller. In collaboration with the Hong Kong government, MTR acquires development rights to land along new rail lines. These plots are often undeveloped or on the outskirts of new towns. After obtaining the land at cost, MTR plans and develops residential and commercial projects, generating massive revenue through property sales, mall rentals, and property management. For instance, the Elements shopping mall and luxury residential complexes atop Kowloon Station have transformed the station into a multifunctional urban hub combining transport, housing, commerce, and consumption. These property-related earnings are the most lucrative component of MTR’s financial performance.

In recent years, MTR’s annual income from "property development and leasing" has reached tens of billions of Hong Kong dollars, sometimes surpassing ticket revenue. Even rental income from retail shops and advertising space within stations contributes significantly. At high-traffic hubs like Causeway Bay and Central, shop rental rates can reach several thousand HKD per square foot, comparable to prime street-level commercial spaces.

Moreover, MTR has actively expanded overseas, managing and advising on metro systems in cities such as Beijing, Shenzhen, London, and Sydney. This diversification has added new streams of international revenue. Domestically, MTR also earns government-authorized project management fees for infrastructure works, including the construction of new lines like the Tuen Ma and South Island lines, further boosting its bottom line.

In contrast, mainland metro systems are usually built and operated by local governments or municipal platforms. The land development process is typically handled by separate entities, meaning metro operators are excluded from real estate profits resulting from increased land values brought by new lines. This disconnection—"rails belong to the metro operator, real estate to developers"—prevents rail companies from creating a sustainable financial cycle and leaves them dependent on fiscal allocations or subsidies. Additionally, with a strong public service mandate, mainland systems often charge low fares and offer free or discounted rides to various groups, making it difficult for operating revenues to cover the high costs of maintenance and staffing, resulting in persistent financial pressure.

In short, the reason MTR is profitable is that it is not merely a transit operator but also an urban space integrator and real estate developer. Its revenue model extends far beyond ticketing, relying on a well-coordinated capital system enabled by favorable land policies and urban planning. For mainland China to replicate the MTR model, it would need to address institutional barriers such as departmental fragmentation, the separation of land rights, and the absence of integrated funding mechanisms. Without these reforms, in a reality where fares can't rise and costs can’t fall, continued deficits are all but inevitable.