歐盟各國近日達成一致，決定將約2100億歐元的俄羅斯央行在歐洲的資產無限期凍結，這筆錢主要集中存放在比利時的歐洲清算銀行（Euroclear）。這不再是暫時性的制裁，而是帶有「戰略資產扣押」意味的長期安排，等同於向俄羅斯傳遞一個訊號：在俄烏戰爭結束、甚至戰後安排未明朗之前，這筆錢都不會解凍。

俄羅斯方面的反應極其強硬。本週五，俄羅斯央行已正式在莫斯科對歐洲清算銀行提起訴訟，指控其非法凍結主權資產，並公開放話將展開全球範圍的對等報復。這不只是法律糾紛，而是一場圍繞「主權金融資產是否仍然安全」的制度性衝突。對莫斯科而言，若連央行外匯儲備都能被長期凍結，等同於戰後金融秩序對俄羅斯徹底失效。

在歐盟凍結資產的同時，俄羅斯也早已布下反制機制，其中最關鍵的就是所謂的「C 類帳戶制度」。過去，俄羅斯企業向海外股東分紅、或支付歐元債券利息時，資金通常直接匯入歐洲清算銀行的總帳戶，再由國際托管體系分配給投資人。但在制裁生效後，這條通道被俄方單方面切斷。俄羅斯央行規定，凡是來自「不友好國家」的投資者，其應得的股息、利息或清償款項，一律只能進入在俄羅斯境內開設的 C 類帳戶。

這種帳戶在法律上極為諷刺。帳面上，資金仍屬於投資者本人，但實際上幾乎無法動用。錢不能匯出境外，只能在俄羅斯境內使用，例如繳稅、購買俄羅斯國債，或乾脆什麼都做不了。對歐美金融機構而言，這等同於資產被「半沒收」，既不算正式充公，又永遠無法回到資產負債表中自由運用。

更具殺傷力的，是俄羅斯近來推動的「反向穿透」機制。長期以來，歐洲清算銀行這類國際托管機構就像一個黑盒子，真正的最終受益人往往被層層包裹，俄羅斯並不清楚背後是誰在持有資產。現在，俄方透過法律強制要求，俄羅斯境內的托管機構必須將 C 類帳戶的帳冊獨立出來，甚至交由俄羅斯的官方註冊機構直接記帳。這等於反過來逼迫國際金融體系「攤牌」，交出最終投資者名單。

在這個框架下，出現明顯的分化。如果你是中東、亞洲或其他被俄羅斯視為「友好國家」的資本持有人，就必須親自或透過托管行提交證明文件，證明自己並不在「不友好國家名單」中。一旦身分被驗證，就有機會申請特別許可，將資金轉出 C 類帳戶，重新流動起來。但如果你是歐美的銀行、基金或金融機構，且無法或不被允許完成這種「自證清白」，那麼你的資金就只能長期滯留在 C 類帳戶內，實質上成為俄羅斯手中的金融人質。

從宏觀層面來看，這場對峙已經遠遠超出單純的資產凍結或反凍結問題。歐盟以凍結央行資產作為對烏克蘭戰爭的長期籌碼，而俄羅斯則用C類帳戶與反向穿透，把歐洲和美國的金融機構拖入一場「誰也別想全身而退」的消耗戰。這不只是俄歐之間的衝突，而是對整個全球金融秩序的一次嚴峻考驗：當主權資產與跨境投資不再安全，所謂的中立清算體系，也就不再中立了。

The core of this development marks a new phase of long-term, institutionalized financial confrontation between Russia and the European Union. EU member states have recently reached a consensus to freeze approximately €210 billion in Russian central bank assets held in Europe on an indefinite basis. Most of these assets are deposited with Euroclear, the European clearing house based in Belgium. This decision goes far beyond a temporary sanctions measure and carries the character of a strategic asset lock-up, effectively signaling to Moscow that the funds will not be released until the war in Ukraine ends—or possibly not even then, depending on postwar arrangements.

Russia’s response has been forceful and confrontational. On Friday, the Russian central bank formally filed a lawsuit in Moscow against Euroclear, accusing it of unlawfully freezing sovereign assets, and openly warned of global retaliatory measures. This is not merely a legal dispute but a fundamental clash over whether sovereign financial assets can still be considered safe under the existing international system. From Moscow’s perspective, the long-term freezing of central bank reserves means that the postwar global financial order has effectively ceased to function for Russia.

In parallel with the EU’s decision, Russia has already put in place countermeasures, the most important of which is the so-called “Type C account” system. In the past, when Russian companies paid dividends to foreign shareholders or serviced interest on euro-denominated bonds, the funds were transferred directly to Euroclear’s master account and then distributed through the international custodial network. That channel has now been unilaterally severed by Russia. Under new rules issued by the Russian central bank, any dividends, interest payments, or debt repayments owed to investors from “unfriendly countries” must be deposited into special Type C accounts opened within Russia.

Legally, these accounts are deeply ironic. On paper, the funds still belong to the investors. In reality, they are almost entirely inaccessible. The money cannot be transferred abroad and can only be used domestically within Russia—for example, to pay taxes, purchase Russian government bonds, or, in many cases, not be used at all. For European and U.S. financial institutions, this amounts to a form of “partial expropriation”: the assets are not officially confiscated, yet they can never be freely reintegrated into balance sheets.

Even more disruptive is Russia’s push for what can be described as “reverse look-through” enforcement. Traditionally, international clearing systems like Euroclear operate as black boxes, with the ultimate beneficial owners hidden behind multiple layers of custody, leaving Russia unable to identify who actually holds the assets. Now, through new regulations, Russia is forcing domestic custodians to separate the ledgers of Type C accounts and, in some cases, place them directly under the supervision of Russian registration authorities. In effect, Moscow is compelling the global financial system to reveal the names behind the assets.

This framework creates a sharp divide among investors. Those from the Middle East, Asia, or other jurisdictions Russia considers “friendly” must personally—or through their custodian banks—submit documentation proving they are not on the “unfriendly countries” list. Once their identity is verified, they may apply for special permission to transfer funds out of the Type C accounts and restore liquidity. By contrast, Western banks, asset managers, and financial institutions that cannot—or are not allowed to—“prove their innocence” are left with no such option. Their funds remain locked indefinitely, effectively turning into financial hostages in Russian hands.

At a broader level, this confrontation has moved far beyond a simple freeze-and-retaliate cycle. The EU is using frozen central bank assets as long-term leverage tied to the war in Ukraine, while Russia is responding with Type C accounts and reverse look-through mechanisms that drag Western financial institutions into a prolonged war of attrition. What is at stake is not just the Russia–EU relationship, but the credibility of the global financial system itself. When sovereign assets and cross-border investments can no longer be considered secure, the notion of a neutral international clearing system effectively ceases to exist.