自2025年底以來,伊朗正陷入自2022年以來規模最大、影響最深遠的一場全國性示威浪潮
自2025年底以來,伊朗正陷入自2022年以來規模最大、影響最深遠的一場全國性示威浪潮。這波抗議運動於12月28日正式引爆,最初源於經濟體系的全面崩潰,但在短短數日內迅速轉化為針對整個政治體制的挑戰,演變成公開要求推翻現行神權政權的政治運動。示威不再只是零星抗議,而是橫跨多個城市、不同社會階層的集體反抗,顯示伊朗社會長期累積的不滿已達臨界點。
經濟因素是這場風暴最直接、也最具破壞力的導火線。伊朗貨幣里亞爾在短時間內急速貶值,兌美元匯率跌至歷史最低點,甚至一度出現一美元兌換超過一百二十五萬里亞爾的極端情況。這不僅摧毀民眾的儲蓄,也讓進口商品成本暴漲。惡性通膨全面失控,到了2025年底,官方數據顯示通膨率已突破50%,但民間普遍認為實際體感更為嚴重。食用油、雞肉、麵粉等基本民生物資價格在短時間內翻倍,許多商品甚至直接從市場貨架上消失,形成半飢荒狀態。尤為關鍵的是,向來被視為政權經濟支柱的傳統巴扎商人,也因匯率劇烈波動與進口受阻而遭受重創。德黑蘭多個巴扎區域出現大規模罷市,象徵政權在經濟層面的核心支持正在崩解,並成為抗議全面擴散的重要觸媒。
與此同時,基礎設施與民生危機進一步加劇社會的不安。長期的電力短缺導致頻繁停電,供水不穩成為多個城市的日常狀態,燃油配給制度也難以滿足需求。官方報告顯示,早在2024年,就已有超過一半的伊朗人口處於營養不良或接近營養不足的狀態,反映出社會底層承受的巨大壓力。失業問題同樣嚴峻,尤其是在25至40歲的勞動主力男性族群中,失業率高達約50%。對許多年輕人而言,既無工作、也看不到未來,生活的絕望感成為他們走上街頭的重要原因。
隨著抗議持續擴大,民眾的訴求迅速從經濟改善升級為政治變革。街頭口號不再只是要求降低物價或穩定匯率,而是直接指向最高領袖哈梅內伊,出現公開呼喊「獨裁者去死」的激進標語。部分示威者更進一步表達對現行神權體制的全面否定,轉而呼籲流亡海外的前皇太子禮薩.巴列維回國,甚至在街頭高喊致敬巴列維王朝的口號,顯示社會中對世俗政體或君主制的懷舊情緒正在回溫。現任總統裴澤斯基安雖曾承諾改善經濟、放寬社會管控,甚至暗示將檢討網路審查政策,但由於他無法實際掌控革命衛隊與安全部門,加上改革承諾遲遲未能兌現,民眾對政府的信任迅速流失。
國際環境的惡化也成為壓垮伊朗經濟的重要外部因素。2025年9月,聯合國因伊朗核計畫與飛彈問題,重新啟動所謂的「快回機制」制裁,導致大量海外資產遭到凍結,能源出口與金融結算進一步受阻。在此同時,伊朗政府仍持續投入大量資源於與以色列、美國的對抗,以及對地區武裝組織的支持。這種對外強硬、對內緊縮的政策路線,引發民眾強烈不滿,許多人認為國家財富被消耗在地緣政治冒險中,而非用於改善人民生活。
目前局勢仍高度緊張,伊朗政府已採取一系列強硬鎮壓措施,包括大規模切斷網路與通訊、動用實彈與金屬彈藥驅散示威人群。根據外媒與人權組織的報導,衝突已造成數十人死亡、數千人被逮捕,實際傷亡數字可能更高。在經濟崩潰、政治失信與國際孤立多重壓力交織之下,這場示威運動已不再只是短期動盪,而被視為伊朗體制面臨的一次關鍵性考驗,其走向與結果,將深刻影響伊朗未來的政治與社會結構。
Since late 2025, Iran has been gripped by its largest and most far-reaching nationwide wave of protests since 2022. The demonstrations erupted on December 28, initially triggered by a full-scale economic collapse, but within days they rapidly evolved into a direct political movement calling for the overthrow of the ruling system. What began as scattered economic protests has expanded into a cross-city, cross-class uprising, revealing that long-accumulated social anger has reached a breaking point.
Economic collapse is the most immediate and destructive catalyst behind the unrest. Iran’s currency, the rial, has plunged sharply in a short period of time, falling to a historic low against the US dollar and at one point reaching the extreme rate of more than 1.25 million rials to one dollar. This not only wiped out personal savings but also sent import costs soaring. Hyperinflation spiraled out of control, with official figures showing inflation exceeding 50 percent by the end of 2025, while many Iranians believe the real impact felt even worse. Prices of basic necessities such as cooking oil, chicken, and flour doubled almost overnight, and many items vanished entirely from store shelves, creating conditions resembling a partial famine. Particularly significant was the reaction of the traditional bazaar merchants, long regarded as a core economic pillar of the regime. Severe exchange-rate volatility and disrupted imports caused heavy losses, leading to large-scale shop closures and strikes in Tehran’s bazaars. Their participation signaled a serious erosion of the regime’s traditional support base and became a key trigger for the nationwide spread of protests.
At the same time, deepening infrastructure and livelihood crises further intensified public anger. Chronic power shortages have led to frequent blackouts, unstable water supplies have become routine in many cities, and fuel shortages remain unresolved. Official reports indicate that as early as 2024, more than half of Iran’s population was already suffering from malnutrition or hovering on the brink of it, highlighting the immense pressure on lower-income groups. Unemployment has become equally severe, particularly among men aged 25 to 40, where jobless rates have reportedly reached around 50 percent. For many young people, the absence of work and any sense of future opportunity has created profound despair, driving them into the streets.
As protests continued to expand, public demands quickly escalated from calls for economic relief to outright political change. Slogans no longer focused solely on prices or exchange rates but directly targeted Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, with chants openly calling for the death of the “dictator.” Some demonstrators went further, expressing outright rejection of the current theocratic system and calling for the return of exiled former crown prince Reza Pahlavi. In some areas, crowds even chanted slogans praising the Pahlavi monarchy, reflecting a growing nostalgia for a secular political order. Although President Masoud Pezeshkian had promised economic improvements and hinted at easing social controls, including internet censorship, his inability to exert real authority over the security forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, combined with the lack of tangible reforms, quickly eroded public trust.
The worsening international environment has also played a critical role in exacerbating Iran’s crisis. In September 2025, the United Nations reactivated the “snapback” sanctions mechanism over Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, freezing overseas assets and further crippling energy exports and financial transactions. At the same time, the Iranian government continued to devote substantial resources to confrontations with Israel and the United States, as well as to supporting regional armed groups. This outwardly aggressive but inwardly austere policy has fueled widespread resentment, with many citizens believing national wealth is being squandered on geopolitical ventures rather than used to improve domestic living conditions.
The situation remains extremely tense. The Iranian authorities have responded with harsh suppression measures, including widespread internet shutdowns, communication blackouts, and the use of live ammunition and metal pellets against protesters. According to reports from international media and human rights organizations, dozens have been killed and thousands arrested, with the true casualty figures likely higher. Amid the convergence of economic collapse, political disillusionment, and international isolation, this protest movement is no longer seen as a short-term disturbance but as a critical test of Iran’s political system—one whose outcome will profoundly shape the country’s future political and social landscape.
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