在台灣，死刑雖然在法律體系中尚未被正式廢除，但從判決到實際執行的過程，已被層層制度設計與憲法解釋高度限縮，使其成為一種「存在於法條、卻極難落實於現實」的刑罰。其困難度並非來自單一因素，而是司法程序的極端嚴謹、憲法法庭的實質限縮解釋，以及國際人權法制長期影響所交織而成的結果。

首先，在憲法層級上，死刑的適用範圍已被大幅壓縮。憲法法庭於2024年9月作成的「113年憲判字第8號」判決，雖然明確宣示死刑並未違憲，但同時也設下近乎「不可逾越」的高門檻。該判決強調，死刑僅能適用於「情節最重大之罪」，也就是必須屬於故意殺人，且行為人的主觀惡性、犯罪動機、手段殘忍程度與結果危害性，均達到極端嚴重的程度，否則即不符死刑要件。此外，判決對程序正當性提出更嚴格的要求，只要在偵查或審判過程中發現被告存在精神障礙、心智缺陷，或其責任能力有疑義，法院原則上即不得判處或執行死刑。更具關鍵性的限制，在於「一致決」門檻的確立：不論是一審、二審或最高法院，只要是死刑案件，合議庭必須全體法官一致同意，才能作成死刑判決。以最高法院為例，五名法官中只要有一人反對，死刑即無法成立，這在實務上幾乎將死刑判決推向極端少數的例外狀態。

其次，國民法官制度的引入，進一步提高死刑量刑的共識難度。在適用國民法官參審的重大刑案中，若要判處死刑，必須取得三分之二以上的同意票數，也就是至少六票贊成，而且這六票之中，還必須同時包含至少一名職業法官與一名國民法官的同意。這種設計不僅要求「高比例多數」，更要求「跨角色共識」，在社會價值高度分歧、對死刑看法不一的情況下，實務上極難達成，導致國民法官參與的案件中，死刑幾乎成為理論上的選項。

再從更宏觀的角度來看，國際人權公約與全球廢死趨勢，對台灣司法實務產生長期且深層的影響。雖然台灣並非聯合國會員國，但已將《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》（公政公約）與《經濟社會文化權利國際公約》正式國內法化，使其在法律位階與適用上，對法院具有實質拘束力。公政公約中對「生命權」的高度保障，以及對死刑「逐步限制、最終廢除」的國際趨勢，深刻影響法官的量刑思維。在實務上，法院往往會著重評估被告是否仍具有「教化可能性」，只要存在可改過、可再社會化的空間，即可能被視為不宜判處死刑的理由，進一步縮小死刑適用的實際空間。

即便在極少數案件中死刑判決確定，真正進入執行階段仍面臨重重障礙。現行制度下，死刑犯只要提出非常上訴、再審聲請，或向憲法法庭聲請釋憲，法務部通常會以「救濟程序尚未終結」為由，暫緩執行死刑。這使得死刑在執行面形成一種高度不確定、可長期停滯的狀態。實際數據也反映這一現象，自2020年以來，台灣死刑的執行次數明顯下降。即便在賴清德政府上任後，也直到2025年 1 月，才對死囚黃麟凱執行槍決，而該案亦成為死刑釋憲後，極為罕見的實際執行案例。

值得注意的是，法律實務的高度限縮，與社會多數民意之間，正形成明顯落差。根據2024年底的多項民調顯示，超過八成台灣民眾反對廢除死刑，其中更有超過六成五的民眾支持在2026年舉行「反廢死」公投。這種「民意高度支持、制度實際凍結」的現象，已成為台灣死刑議題中最具張力的核心矛盾，也預示未來在憲政、司法與民主政治層面，仍將持續引發激烈討論與衝突。

In Taiwan, although the death penalty has not been formally abolished in the legal system, the process from sentencing to actual execution has been heavily constrained by multiple institutional designs and constitutional interpretations, making it a punishment that exists in law but is extremely difficult to carry out in reality. This difficulty does not stem from a single factor, but from the intersection of extremely rigorous judicial procedures, the Constitutional Court’s restrictive interpretations, and the long-term influence of international human rights frameworks.

First, at the constitutional level, the scope of applying the death penalty has been significantly narrowed. In September 2024, the Constitutional Court issued Decision No. 113, which clearly stated that the death penalty is not unconstitutional, but also set nearly insurmountable high thresholds. The decision emphasized that the death penalty may only be applied to the “most serious crimes,” meaning it must involve intentional homicide, and the perpetrator’s subjective malice, motive, cruel means, and the severity of harm must all reach an extremely severe level. Otherwise, it does not meet the criteria for capital punishment. Additionally, the decision imposes stricter procedural fairness requirements: if the defendant is found to have a mental disorder or cognitive impairment during investigation or trial, the court generally must not sentence or execute the death penalty. A more critical limitation is the establishment of a “unanimous decision” threshold: in death penalty cases at any level—first instance, second instance, or the Supreme Court—the collegiate panel must unanimously agree to impose the death penalty. In practice, this makes capital sentences almost impossible, since even one dissenting judge in the Supreme Court’s five-member panel will prevent the death penalty from being imposed.

Second, the introduction of the lay judge system further increases the difficulty of reaching consensus on capital punishment. In major criminal cases involving the death penalty where lay judges participate, a death sentence requires at least a two-thirds majority—meaning at least six votes in favor—and this must include at least one professional judge and one lay judge. This design not only demands a high proportion of support but also cross-role consensus. In a society where views on the death penalty are highly polarized, it becomes extremely difficult to achieve in practice, making the death penalty almost theoretical in cases with lay judge participation.

From a broader perspective, international human rights conventions and the global trend toward abolition have had a long-term and profound impact on Taiwan’s judicial practice. Although Taiwan is not a UN member, it has domestically incorporated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), giving them substantial binding force in domestic law. The ICCPR’s strong protection of the right to life and the international trend toward “restricting and ultimately abolishing” the death penalty deeply influence judges’ sentencing thinking. In practice, courts often emphasize evaluating whether the defendant still has the possibility of rehabilitation. If there is room for reform and reintegration into society, this may be considered a reason not to impose the death penalty, further narrowing its practical application.

Even in the rare cases where the death penalty is finalized, execution still faces many obstacles. Under the current system, as long as death row inmates file extraordinary appeals, retrials, or constitutional petitions, the Ministry of Justice typically postpones execution on the grounds that the relief procedures are not yet complete. This creates a highly uncertain and potentially prolonged state for the death penalty in practice. Actual data also reflect this phenomenon: since 2020, the frequency of executions in Taiwan has significantly declined. Even after the Lai Ching-te administration took office, it was not until January 2025 that the government executed death row inmate Huang Lin-kai by shooting, which became an extremely rare execution case following the constitutional ruling.

It is also worth noting that the highly restrictive judicial practice stands in clear contrast to public opinion. According to multiple polls at the end of 2024, over 80% of Taiwanese people oppose abolishing the death penalty, and more than 65% support holding an “anti-abolition” referendum in 2026. This “high public support but institutional paralysis” phenomenon has become the core contradiction in Taiwan’s death penalty debate, indicating that constitutional, judicial, and democratic political tensions will continue to provoke intense discussion and conflict in the future.