近來俄羅斯在對烏克蘭的軍事行動中，明顯將打擊重心放在變電站等電力輸配節點，而非直接摧毀大型發電廠或核電設施。這種策略並非偶然，而是一種兼顧軍事效率、成本控制與心理戰效果的系統性作法，其核心目標在於「瓦解整個電力網路」，而不是單純削弱發電能力。

首先，從軍事與工程角度來看，變電站本身的防禦層級遠低於大型發電廠。核電廠、水力或火力發電站通常受到多層防空系統與實體防護包圍，且一旦遭受攻擊，容易引發國際社會高度關注甚至核安全疑慮，政治風險極高。相較之下，變電站數量龐大、分布廣泛，多位於城市邊緣或交通樞紐附近，防護能力有限，更容易成為精準打擊的目標。尤其變電站內的關鍵設備如大型變壓器，屬於高度客製化、價格昂貴且生產週期極長的工業設備，一旦遭到破壞，短時間內幾乎不可能迅速修復或從國外緊急補充，這使得攻擊的「長期破壞效果」遠高於表面上的破壞規模。

其次，俄方的策略著眼於癱瘓整個電力輸送網絡，而非單點破壞。即便烏克蘭仍保有部分發電能力，只要關鍵變電站與輸電節點被切斷，電力便無法有效輸送至城市與工業區，整個系統仍會陷入失能狀態。特別是攻擊連接核電廠與主幹電網的變電站，可以在不直接觸碰高風險目標的情況下，切斷超過一半的電力來源，這在戰術上既安全又高效。

進一步來看，這類攻擊在冬季具有極強的「放大效應」。在嚴寒氣候下，電力不僅關係到照明，更直接影響供暖系統、供水設備與通訊網絡。一旦變電站遭破壞，城市可能同時面臨停電、停暖與缺水的連鎖危機，居民基本生活條件迅速惡化。根據截至 2026 年1月的統計，基輔因能源設施持續遭到轟炸，已有約60萬名居民被迫離開城市，尋求較安全且具備基本生活機能的地區。這種人口外流不僅對城市運作造成沉重負擔，也加劇了全國層級的安置與社會壓力。

此外，變電站遭到破壞會直接癱瘓多項關鍵基礎設施。烏克蘭的鐵路運輸系統高度依賴電力，一旦電網不穩，列車班次將大幅削減甚至全面停擺，影響軍事調動與民生物流。工業生產線、醫院的維生設備、通訊中心與資料網絡，也都因電力中斷而陷入危機，進一步削弱國家的持續作戰與治理能力。

從心理戰層面來看，這種戰術同樣具有深遠影響。長時間處於黑暗、寒冷與資源短缺的環境，會嚴重打擊民眾的安全感與信心。基輔市長克利奇科（Vitali Klitschko）便指出，能源設施反覆遭到攻擊，使許多市民已無法維持最基本的生活品質，最終選擇在1月出現大規模撤離潮。這樣的結果，正是透過低於全面轟炸成本的方式，逐步削弱城市韌性與社會穩定。

總體而言，俄羅斯選擇集中攻擊變電站，而非直接炸毀電廠，是一種結合軍事現實、工程限制與戰略心理效果的精密作法。透過破壞看似不起眼、卻高度關鍵的電力節點，不僅能以相對低成本造成長期且難以逆轉的基礎設施癱瘓，也在極端氣候條件下放大人道與社會衝擊，成為現代戰爭中「系統性打擊」的典型案例。

In recent military operations against Ukraine, Russia has clearly shifted its focus toward striking power substations and electricity transmission nodes, rather than directly destroying large power plants or nuclear facilities. This approach is not accidental, but a systematic strategy that balances military efficiency, cost control, and psychological impact. Its core objective is to collapse the entire power grid, not merely to reduce electricity generation capacity.

From a military and engineering standpoint, substations are far less well defended than major power plants. Nuclear, hydroelectric, and thermal power stations are typically protected by multiple layers of air defense and physical fortifications, and any direct attack on them would draw intense international scrutiny and raise serious nuclear safety concerns, significantly increasing political risk. Substations, by contrast, are numerous, widely dispersed, and often located on the outskirts of cities or near transportation hubs, where defenses are limited. This makes them far easier targets for precision strikes. Moreover, key components within substations—such as large transformers—are highly specialized, extremely expensive, and have long production lead times. Once destroyed, they cannot be quickly repaired or replaced through emergency imports, giving such attacks a long-lasting disruptive effect that far exceeds their apparent scale.

Beyond individual targets, Russia’s strategy is aimed at paralyzing the electricity transmission network as a whole rather than inflicting isolated damage. Even if Ukraine retains some power generation capacity, electricity cannot reach cities or industrial areas once critical substations and transmission nodes are severed. In particular, attacking substations that connect nuclear power plants to the main grid allows Russia to cut off more than half of Ukraine’s electricity supply without directly striking high-risk facilities—making the tactic both safer and more effective from a military perspective.

These attacks are especially devastating in winter, when their impact is significantly amplified. In extreme cold, electricity is not only essential for lighting, but also for heating systems, water supply infrastructure, and communications networks. Once substations are damaged, cities can simultaneously lose power, heating, and water, rapidly degrading basic living conditions. According to data up to January 2026, continued bombardment of energy facilities in Kyiv has forced approximately 600,000 residents to leave the city in search of safer areas with reliable basic services. This mass displacement not only disrupts urban operations but also places enormous strain on national-level resettlement systems and social stability.

Damage to substations also directly cripples critical infrastructure. Ukraine’s railway system relies heavily on electric power, and grid instability can sharply reduce train services or bring them to a complete halt, affecting both military logistics and civilian supply chains. Industrial production, hospital life-support equipment, communications centers, and data networks are likewise vulnerable to power outages, further weakening the country’s ability to sustain governance and military operations.

From a psychological warfare perspective, this strategy is equally impactful. Prolonged exposure to darkness, cold, and resource shortages severely undermines public morale and sense of security. Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko has stated that repeated attacks on energy infrastructure have made it impossible for many residents to maintain even the most basic living conditions, ultimately triggering a large-scale outflow of people in January. This outcome reflects how relatively low-cost strikes can gradually erode urban resilience and social stability.

Overall, Russia’s decision to concentrate on attacking substations rather than power plants represents a calculated strategy shaped by military realities, engineering constraints, and psychological objectives. By destroying seemingly modest yet critically important nodes in the power system, Russia can inflict long-term, hard-to-reverse infrastructure paralysis at relatively low cost. Under harsh winter conditions, this approach magnifies humanitarian and societal impacts, making it a textbook example of system-level targeting in modern warfare.