蒙古國在外交取向上長期呈現出「疏中、親俄、好日韓」的鮮明特徵，其核心邏輯可歸納為「第三鄰國」戰略。這並非情緒化選邊，而是一套在中俄兩大強權夾縫中求生存、保主權的高度理性選擇。對蒙古而言，國家獨立本身就是最高政治價值，而所有外交判斷，幾乎都圍繞著如何避免再次被任何強權主導。

蒙古對中國保持高度防禦心理，首先源於其現代建國歷史。1921年，蒙古人民黨在蘇聯支持下宣布脫離中華民國體系而獨立，這段歷史使蒙古國的政權合法性，從一開始就與「反對中國統治」緊密相連。在蒙古的政治敘事與集體記憶中，任何被視為過度親中的政策，都可能被解讀為動搖國家獨立根基。因此，即使在經貿層面高度依賴中國，蒙古社會與菁英階層仍普遍對中國保持警惕。

這種心理也與地緣現實密不可分。蒙古被中國與俄羅斯完全包圍，缺乏出海口，經濟結構又高度仰賴對中國出口煤炭、礦產等資源，使其在貿易上處於明顯弱勢。這種單一市場依賴，讓蒙古內部長期存在被中國「經濟虹吸」甚至「溫水煮青蛙式吸收」的焦慮。此外，中國內蒙古自治區的快速發展與人口規模，也加深了蒙古國對文化邊緣化與民族認同流失的憂慮，進一步放大了對中防禦心態。

相較之下，蒙古對俄羅斯的親近，更多是基於安全與戰略現實。自 1921 年起，蒙古與蘇聯、再到今日的俄羅斯，一直維持密切關係。對蒙古而言，俄羅斯不只是歷史盟友，更是制衡中國影響力的關鍵力量。在軍事層面，蒙古的武器裝備、訓練體系與防衛結構，大多沿襲俄系系統，短期內難以替代；在能源層面，蒙古高度依賴俄羅斯供應石油與相關能源產品，形成長期且結構性的互賴關係。這使得俄羅斯在蒙古眼中，成為不可或缺的「安全後盾」，即便關係未必完全對等。

至於日本與韓國，則是蒙古「第三鄰國」戰略中最受歡迎、也最具象徵意義的夥伴。所謂「第三鄰國」，指的是在中俄之外，主動發展與民主國家及遠距大國的關係，以分散風險、提升外交自主性。日本在蒙古民間擁有極高好感度，其中一個重要原因是相撲文化的影響。朝青龍、白鵬等蒙古力士在日本相撲界取得傳奇地位，意外促成了一種獨特的「相撲外交」，讓日本在蒙古社會中被視為友好且尊重蒙古文化的國家。

此外，自1990年代以來，日本對蒙古提供大量無償援助與官方開發協助，涵蓋基礎建設、教育與城市發展等領域，烏蘭巴托的重要交通設施中至今仍可見日本援建的痕跡。在民生層面，日本二手SUV與油電車幾乎主導蒙古汽車市場，也讓日本形象與「可靠、耐用」深度綁定。

韓國在蒙古的影響力則來自經濟與文化雙重層面。韓國是蒙古勞工海外工作的主要目的地之一，對許多家庭而言，赴韓工作是改善生活的重要途徑。同時，韓流文化在蒙古年輕世代中高度流行，對娛樂、時尚與語言學習產生實質影響。在國家層級，蒙韓已建立正式的「戰略夥伴關係」，雙方在投資、產業與人力交流上具有高度互補性，使韓國成為蒙古最重要的亞洲夥伴之一。

整體而言，蒙古的外交傾向並非簡單的「仇中、親俄、愛日韓」，而是一套在地緣壓力下精算得失的生存策略。透過「第三鄰國」政策，蒙古試圖在兩個強勢鄰國之間保持距離，同時引入更多外部力量作為平衡槓桿，以確保國家主權、政策空間與文化自主性不被侵蝕。這種選擇，反映的正是小國在大國博弈夾縫中，所能做出的最務實回應。

Mongolia’s foreign policy is often described through its “Third Neighbor” strategy, a diplomatic approach shaped by strong historical sovereignty awareness, geopolitical survival between great powers, and the need for economic diversification. This framework explains why Mongolia tends to maintain a cautious, defensive attitude toward China, remains closely aligned with Russia, and shows clear goodwill toward countries such as Japan and South Korea. At its core, Mongolia places national independence above all else, views Russia as a key security and energy partner, and regards Japan and South Korea as valuable economic supporters and democratic collaborators.

Mongolia’s wariness toward China is rooted deeply in its modern statehood. The Mongolian People’s Party declared independence in 1921 with Soviet backing, breaking away from the Republic of China. As a result, the legitimacy of the modern Mongolian state is historically intertwined with resistance to Chinese control. For many Mongolians, any policy perceived as moving too close to China raises fears of undermining sovereignty. This sensitivity is reinforced by geography: Mongolia is landlocked between China and Russia and is economically highly dependent on China, particularly for coal and mineral exports. Such dependence fuels anxiety about economic “absorption” or overreliance, while the rapid development of China’s Inner Mongolia region has also heightened concerns about cultural dilution and identity loss.

At the same time, Mongolia’s closeness with Russia is largely pragmatic rather than emotional. Since 1921, Mongolia has maintained strong ties with the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation, with Russia long viewed as a strategic counterbalance to Chinese influence. Mongolia’s military equipment is overwhelmingly of Russian origin, and much of its defense infrastructure remains interoperable with Russian systems. In addition, Mongolia relies heavily on Russia for petroleum products, creating a long-standing energy dependency that reinforces bilateral cooperation. Together, these factors make Russia a crucial pillar of Mongolia’s national security strategy.

Japan and South Korea, meanwhile, occupy a special place within Mongolia’s “Third Neighbor” policy, which seeks to reduce reliance on its two immediate neighbors by cultivating close relationships with distant but influential partners such as the United States, Japan, South Korea, and the European Union. Japan enjoys particularly strong goodwill among the Mongolian public, in part due to the success of Mongolian wrestlers such as Asashōryū and Hakuhō in Japan’s professional sumo world. Their dominance helped create a form of informal “sumo diplomacy,” strengthening cultural ties and public affection. Japan has also been a major source of development assistance since the 1990s, contributing significantly to infrastructure projects, including major bridges in Ulaanbaatar. In everyday life, Japanese-used SUVs and hybrid vehicles dominate Mongolia’s car market, further embedding Japan’s presence in the country.

South Korea’s appeal to Mongolia is driven by both economic opportunity and cultural influence. Korea is a popular destination for Mongolian migrant workers, providing employment opportunities that support many households back home. At the same time, Korean popular culture has gained widespread popularity in Mongolia, shaping fashion, entertainment, and youth culture. On a governmental level, the two countries have established a formal strategic partnership, supported by strong economic complementarity, with South Korea ranking among Mongolia’s key investors.

Taken together, Mongolia’s diplomatic orientation is not the result of ideological alignment but a calculated effort to maximize national autonomy and safeguard independence while navigating life between two powerful neighbors. The “Third Neighbor” strategy represents a rational response to geopolitical constraints, allowing Mongolia to diversify its partnerships, balance external pressures, and preserve its sovereign identity.