在Luckin Coffee與Cotti Coffee逐步收縮長期以來的「9.9元咖啡補貼」、開始把重心轉回盈利與營收結構之際，中國西式快餐連鎖品牌Wallace卻反其道而行，以「9.9元咖啡包月卡」的激進定價高調切入咖啡市場。表面上看，這種價格甚至低到接近「自殺式補貼」，但在商業邏輯上，其實隱藏著相當精密的市場策略。

華萊士推出的「9.9元包月」服務，消費者只需支付9.9元人民幣，便可在一個月內享有咖啡相關優惠或兌換權益。在某些極端情況下，如果用戶每天都領取咖啡，平均下來單杯成本甚至可能低於0.05元。從表面數字來看，幾乎沒有任何盈利空間，但業界普遍認為，這並非單純的價格戰，而是一種典型的「高頻產品帶動低頻消費」策略。

咖啡本身是一種高頻消費商品，許多消費者每天都可能購買一杯。透過極低價格的月卡機制，華萊士能夠大幅提高顧客進店或打開品牌App的頻率。當消費者到店領取咖啡時，往往會順便購買其他產品，例如炸雞、漢堡或薯條，而這些食品的單價更高、利潤率也遠高於咖啡。換句話說，咖啡在這個策略中更像是一種「流量入口」，真正的利潤則來自於配餐消費。

此外，華萊士還具備一項重要優勢，那就是龐大的門店密度。該品牌在中國擁有超過兩萬家門店，且大量分布於社區型商圈與下沉市場，也就是三、四線城市或城鎮地區。這些區域恰好是許多專業咖啡品牌尚未完全滲透的市場，因此華萊士能夠利用既有據點，快速把咖啡產品帶入更多日常生活場景。

從整體市場環境來看，中國咖啡產業的競爭格局也正在發生轉變。過去幾年，瑞幸與庫迪曾經展開激烈的補貼戰，以低價促銷迅速擴張市場。然而長期的燒錢競爭也帶來巨大財務壓力，因此兩家公司開始逐步提高優惠門檻，減少單純依賴低價促銷的策略，轉而強調品牌形象、產品品質與門店體驗。

與此同時，像華萊士這樣的跨界餐飲品牌卻開始進攻咖啡市場。對華萊士而言，進入咖啡賽道的成本其實非常低。多數門店原本就配備可樂機、熱飲設備以及完整的餐飲供應鏈，因此幾乎不需要額外的大規模投資即可販售咖啡。從企業經營角度來看，咖啡更像是一種獲客成本（Customer Acquisition Cost, CAC），而不是主要的盈利來源。

業界普遍認為，這種「看似血虧、實則血賺」的策略，其真正價值在於長期用戶鎖定。9.9元月卡能夠讓消費者在整整一個月內優先選擇華萊士作為日常快餐消費地點，從而提升品牌黏性與重複購買率。同時，透過低價月卡吸引用戶註冊並使用小程序或App，也能將顧客導入品牌的私域流量體系，累積消費數據，為未來更精準的行銷活動奠定基礎。

從更宏觀的角度來看，這場競爭也顯示中國咖啡市場正逐漸進入「場景化競爭」的新階段。專業咖啡連鎖品牌主打的是提神需求、品質與門店空間體驗，而像華萊士這樣的快餐品牌，則將咖啡視為日常生活配套的一部分，強調的是便利性與極致性價比。兩種模式的競爭，正在重新塑造中國咖啡消費的市場結構。

As Luckin Coffee and Cotti Coffee gradually scale back their long-running ¥9.9 coffee subsidies and begin shifting their focus toward profitability and revenue stability, the Chinese fast-food giant Wallace has taken the opposite approach. By launching a highly aggressive “¥9.9 monthly coffee pass,” the company has entered the coffee market in a striking way. At first glance, such pricing appears almost like a “suicidal subsidy,” but in reality it reflects a carefully calculated business strategy.

Under Wallace’s new promotion, consumers can pay just ¥9.9 for a monthly coffee membership that grants them access to coffee-related privileges or redemptions for an entire month. In extreme cases, if a user redeems coffee every day, the average cost per cup could drop to less than ¥0.05. From a purely numerical perspective, this leaves almost no room for profit. However, industry analysts widely believe that this is not simply another price war. Instead, it represents a classic strategy in which a high-frequency product is used to stimulate additional purchases of other items.

Coffee is a high-frequency consumer product, with many people buying a cup every day. By offering a very low-cost monthly pass, Wallace significantly increases the likelihood that customers will visit its stores or open its mobile app regularly. Once customers come in to redeem their coffee, they often purchase additional items such as fried chicken, burgers, or fries. These foods carry higher price points and significantly stronger profit margins than coffee. In this model, coffee functions primarily as a traffic driver, while the real profits come from accompanying food purchases.

Another major advantage for Wallace is its massive store network. The chain operates more than 20,000 locations across China, many of which are located in residential neighborhoods and lower-tier markets. These areas include third- and fourth-tier cities and smaller towns where specialized coffee chains have not yet fully penetrated. By leveraging its existing store presence, Wallace can quickly introduce coffee into everyday consumption scenarios in regions that remain underserved by professional coffee brands.

At the broader industry level, the competitive landscape of China’s coffee market is also shifting. Over the past few years, Luckin Coffee and Cotti Coffee engaged in intense subsidy-driven competition, using low prices to rapidly expand market share. However, the long period of heavy spending has created increasing financial pressure. As a result, both companies have begun raising promotional thresholds and reducing reliance on simple price discounts, instead focusing more on brand positioning, product quality, and store experience.

Meanwhile, cross-industry entrants like Wallace are launching offensive strategies in the coffee sector. For Wallace, the cost of entering the coffee business is actually quite low. Most of its outlets already have beverage dispensers, hot drink equipment, and a well-established food supply chain. This allows the company to begin selling coffee with minimal additional investment. From a business perspective, coffee is treated more like a customer acquisition cost (CAC) rather than a primary source of profit.

Many industry observers therefore describe this strategy as one that “appears to lose money but actually generates value.” The ¥9.9 monthly pass effectively locks in consumers’ fast-food choices for an entire month, increasing brand loyalty and repeat purchases. At the same time, the low-cost membership encourages users to register and interact through mini-programs or apps, bringing them into the brand’s private traffic ecosystem. This allows Wallace to accumulate valuable consumer data and lay the groundwork for more precise marketing in the future.

From a broader perspective, this competition signals that China’s coffee market is entering a new stage of scenario-based competition. Professional coffee chains focus on caffeine demand, product quality, and in-store experience, while fast-food brands like Wallace position coffee as part of a daily lifestyle bundle, emphasizing convenience and extreme value for money. The interaction between these two models is gradually reshaping the structure of coffee consumption in China.