在鄭麗文於 2025 年 10 月當選國民黨主席後，她於 2026 年 4 月率團訪問中國，並與 習近平 會面，外界稱之為「鄭習會」。然而，與過去馬英九與習近平舉行的「馬習會」相比，此次會面無論在政治聲量或社會關注度上都顯得相對平淡。

造成這種落差的關鍵因素之一，在於國際地緣政治環境的劇烈變化。在美中科技競爭持續升溫、全球供應鏈重組的背景下，台灣企業界逐漸形成一種「不隨政黨起舞」的生存默契。企業普遍避免高調參與兩岸政治性活動，以免在國際市場上被特定國家標記，進而影響自身布局與發展。因此，相較於過去，工商界對此類訪問的參與意願明顯降低。

同時，兩岸關係的定性也已出現根本轉變。在 賴清德 政府將中國定位為「境外敵對勢力」的政策下，兩岸氛圍趨於緊張。在這樣的情勢中，國民黨主席訪中更容易被貼上政治標籤，也使得整體交流層級與公開互動變得更為謹慎與低調。

此外，禮遇規格的差異也引發外界關注。有媒體觀察指出，鄭麗文與隨行人員是搭乘公務巴士前往人民大會堂，而非享有專屬禮車接送。這樣的安排被部分評論解讀為在外交排場與政治地位上，與卸任元首或具高度政治分量的領袖仍有差距。

在工商界方面，本次訪問的隨行陣容亦顯得相對保守。回顧 2005 年「連胡會」期間，中國經濟正值高速成長，吸引如 郭台銘、辜濂松 等重量級企業家同行。但到了 2026 年，隨著中國經濟成長趨緩，對台商的吸引力已大不如前。工商團體態度也趨於保守，例如 吳東亮 即明確表示其所屬團體未派代表參與。此次隨團者多為黨務人士與學界代表，包括 蘇起、李鴻源、蕭旭岑 等，企業界代表相對有限。

從國內政治角度來看，鄭麗文若欲挑戰更高政治位置，仍面臨一定限制。相較於多數具備地方首長或中央行政歷練的潛在總統候選人，她缺乏相關治理經驗，較難快速累積足夠的行政聲望。此外，雖然她在會面中提出拓展台灣國際空間等主張，並稱獲得習近平正面回應，但習近平同時關切 連戰 與馬英九的近況，也顯示在北京的對台策略中，仍較重視具有長期政治影響力的資深領袖。

整體而言，所謂的「鄭麗文路線」更像是一種為國民黨未來鋪路的戰略布局，而非單純為她個人問鼎總統大位所設計。其核心目的在於強化藍營在兩岸議題上的論述基礎，為 2028 年大選培養更具說服力的政策主軸與政治資源。

After Cheng Li-wen was elected chairperson of the Kuomintang in October 2025, she led a delegation to China in April 2026 and met with Xi Jinping in what has been referred to as the “Cheng–Xi meeting.” However, compared to the earlier high-profile “Ma–Xi meeting” between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi, this encounter received a notably more subdued response, both politically and economically.

One key reason lies in the shifting geopolitical landscape. Amid the intensifying U.S.–China technology rivalry and the restructuring of global supply chains, Taiwanese businesses have developed an unwritten rule of political neutrality. Many companies now avoid visibly aligning with cross-strait political initiatives, fearing potential repercussions from the United States or disruptions to their international operations. As a result, participation in such politically sensitive visits has become far more cautious than in the past.

At the same time, the fundamental characterization of cross-strait relations has changed. Under the administration of Lai Ching-te, China has been officially described as a “foreign hostile force,” reflecting heightened tensions compared to earlier periods. In this environment, a visit to China by the leader of an opposition party is more likely to attract political scrutiny and risk, leading to a more restrained tone and lower-level exchanges.

Differences in diplomatic treatment also drew attention. Observers noted that Cheng Li-wen and her delegation reportedly traveled together by official bus to the Great Hall of the People, rather than receiving individualized high-level transport arrangements. This detail was interpreted by some media outlets as an संकेत of comparatively lower ceremonial status, especially when contrasted with the待遇 typically afforded to former heads of state or senior political figures.

The limited participation of Taiwan’s business elite further highlighted changing economic realities. During the 2005 “Lien–Hu meeting,” when China’s economic boom was at its peak, major business leaders such as Terry Gou and Jeffrey Koo Sr. joined the delegation, attracted by vast commercial opportunities. By 2026, however, China’s economic slowdown has reduced its appeal to Taiwanese investors. Business organizations have also become more cautious; for example, Douglas Hsu publicly stated that his association did not send representatives. Most members of Cheng’s delegation were instead party officials and academics, including figures such as Su Chi, Lee Hong-yuan, and Hsiao Hsu-tsen, with only limited representation from the business sector.

From a domestic political perspective, Cheng Li-wen also faces structural challenges in pursuing higher office. Unlike many leading presidential contenders, she lacks experience as a local executive (such as a mayor) or as a head of a central administrative body. This limits her ability to build the kind of governance credentials typically required for a presidential campaign. Moreover, while she emphasized expanding Taiwan’s international participation and described Xi’s response as positive, Xi reportedly asked about the status of veteran figures like Lien Chan and Ma Ying-jeou during the meeting. This suggests that, from Beijing’s perspective, engagement with Taiwan still prioritizes established political heavyweights with significant influence.

Ultimately, what has been termed the “Cheng Li-wen line” appears to be less about paving the way for her personal presidential ambitions and more about shaping a broader strategic framework for the Kuomintang. According to party insiders, the goal is to strengthen the party’s cross-strait narrative and provide future candidates—particularly in the 2028 presidential election—with a more robust platform, rather than focusing solely on Cheng herself.