這是一個在兩岸政治評論中經常被討論的悖論：即使北京投入大量資源推動所謂「青年與基層統戰」，台灣社會的「台灣人認同」在2024至2026年間仍持續維持在60%以上高點，而「既是台灣人也是中國人」的雙重認同則持續下降。

學界與觀察者普遍認為，這種效果不彰並非單一因素造成，而是多重結構性矛盾長期累積的結果。

首先，經濟誘因與政治壓力之間存在根本矛盾。北京長期透過農產品採購、創業補助與觀光交流等方式試圖提升好感，但同時又伴隨軍機繞台、外交壓縮、反間諜法強化以及對台商的監管與查核等政治與安全壓力。對多數台灣民眾而言，這種「一手給利益、一手施壓力」的模式所帶來的威脅感與不信任感，往往會抵消經濟紅利所產生的吸引力。

其次，北京對台灣民主社會的運作邏輯存在誤判。統戰工作在許多情境下仍依賴由上而下的滲透與中介網絡，例如透過特定團體、地方人脈或既有政治連結來傳遞資源。然而，在高度多元且以選舉為核心的台灣社會中，這種模式往往侷限於小圈層，難以影響中間選民與年輕世代。同時，台灣社會高度重視自由、人權與民主價值，當相關宣傳論述與這些核心價值產生衝突時，反而容易引發反感與防衛心理。

第三，香港經驗對台灣社會產生了明顯的反向強化效果。「一國兩制」原本曾被視為可能的統一方案，但2019年香港局勢變化以及《國安法》實施之後，使台灣社會普遍認為制度承諾可能被快速改變，進一步強化「今日香港、明日台灣」的疑慮。這使得過去作為統戰核心論述的制度想像，在台灣的可信度大幅下降。

第四，數位時代的資訊傳播反而產生逆效果。雖然透過短影音與社群平台的文化交流確實增加接觸，但同時也放大了部分強硬或敵意言論，例如威脅性或貶抑性的網路語言，這在台灣社會中容易被解讀為不友善訊號，進一步強化「他者化」認知。此外，中國內部經濟放緩、疫情治理經驗與社會管控資訊透過網路回流，也削弱了部分台灣民眾對中國發展模式的正面想像。

最後，政策執行過程中的官僚激勵機制也可能降低實際效果。在龐大體系中，績效常以可量化指標呈現，例如活動人數或媒體曝光，導致部分工作流於形式化操作，資源集中於表面成果而非實質影響力。

總體而言，認同的形成主要來自生活經驗與價值契合，而非單純的物質利益交換。當北京的政治體制與台灣的民主價值之間存在結構性張力時，即使投入大量經費，也難以在長期上改變台灣社會的主體認同走向。

This is a paradox frequently discussed in cross-strait political analysis: despite Beijing investing enormous resources into “youth-oriented and grassroots united front work,” Taiwanese identity has remained consistently high—staying above 60% between 2024 and 2026—while dual identity (“both Taiwanese and Chinese”) has steadily declined.

Scholars and political observers generally argue that the limited effectiveness of Taiwan-related united front work can be explained by several structural factors.

First, there is a fundamental contradiction between economic inducement and political coercion. On the one hand, Beijing’s Taiwan policy has long relied on economic incentives such as agricultural procurement, entrepreneurship subsidies, and tourism-related benefits to cultivate goodwill. On the other hand, these efforts are undermined by simultaneous displays of political pressure, including military flights near Taiwan, diplomatic isolation, tightened legal frameworks such as anti-espionage regulations, and scrutiny of Taiwanese businesses operating in mainland China. For many Taiwanese, the psychological impact of coercion and threat perception outweighs the appeal of economic benefits, thereby neutralizing the intended “soft power” effect.

Second, there is a persistent misreading of Taiwan’s democratic and civil society structure. Much of the united front strategy still operates through a top-down logic, relying on intermediaries, local networks, or politically aligned groups to distribute resources. However, in a highly pluralistic and electoral society like Taiwan, such “elite-mediated” approaches tend to remain confined to narrow circles and fail to reach the broader population, particularly younger generations. Moreover, Taiwanese society places strong emphasis on liberal democratic values such as freedom of expression, human rights, and political accountability. When propaganda narratives conflict with these values, they often trigger defensive reactions rather than persuasion.

Third, the Hong Kong experience has produced a strong “backlash effect” in Taiwan. The “one country, two systems” framework was once presented as a model for peaceful unification, but the political developments in Hong Kong after 2019, particularly the implementation of the National Security Law, significantly damaged its credibility in Taiwanese public opinion. The perception that promised autonomy can be rapidly reversed has reinforced skepticism toward similar political proposals and weakened the persuasive foundation of long-term integration narratives.

Fourth, digital media dynamics have created unintended counter-effects. While platforms such as short-video apps and social media channels have enabled greater cultural exposure, they have also amplified highly nationalistic or aggressive online rhetoric. Statements perceived as threatening or demeaning toward Taiwan contribute to stronger boundary formation rather than integration. At the same time, information flows about China’s domestic challenges—such as pandemic policies, economic slowdown, and social controls—circulated through digital channels further reduce the attractiveness of the “China model” among Taiwanese audiences.

Finally, bureaucratic incentives within policy implementation mechanisms may reduce efficiency. In large administrative systems, performance is often measured through quantifiable indicators such as attendance numbers or media visibility. This can lead to symbolic or formalistic activities that prioritize reporting metrics over actual influence, resulting in resource inefficiency and limited real-world impact.

In sum, identity formation is shaped far more by lived experience and value alignment than by material incentives alone. As long as there remains a structural contradiction between Beijing’s political system and Taiwan’s democratic identity, financial investment alone is unlikely to fundamentally shift long-term identity trends in Taiwanese society.