柯文哲目前因涉嫌貪瀆案件而遭羈押，案件性質與發展對民眾黨的未來帶來極大衝擊。柯作為民眾黨創黨領袖及精神象徵，他的個人形象與法律問題密切牽動整個政黨的存續與定位。不同於過去同樣曾涉及司法案件的前總統陳水扁，柯並未曾擔任國家元首，從法律與憲政角度來說，除非執政黨主動施予特赦，否則他難以享有憲法第40條的相關權力保障。加上柯文哲與民進黨關係長期緊繃，甚至屢次公開批判現任政府，這樣的政治敵意讓未來若有赦免可能，幾乎難以發生。

在柯文哲失勢之後，黃國昌接任民眾黨黨主席，象徵著政黨核心將出現重大轉變。黃本身擁有深厚的法律背景與「反黑、反貪、反權貴」的形象，早年透過時代力量累積一定政治資本，後來與民眾黨合作進一步鞏固在「改革派」陣營的領導地位。他的掌舵或許能讓民眾黨短期內維持在野監督力量的角色，但從長遠來看，民眾黨若無法再產生如柯文哲般具有群眾動員與媒體話題性的領袖，其支持度恐將面臨萎縮。

再者，黃國昌與柯文哲在政治語言、溝通風格及議題選擇上有顯著差異。柯擅長利用網路語言與民眾互動，並擁有草根魅力；黃則較偏重制度監督、法案技術與反貪反黑等議題，這在選舉時較難激起情緒性支持。若民眾黨未能在短期內找到新的策略與選票結構，特別是擴展其原本集中於中間選民與青年選民的基礎，其政黨路線將陷入保守化與單一議題化的風險，進而可能如同新黨、親民黨般，走向泡沫化與邊緣化。

至於是否仍有挑戰總統大位的可能性，關鍵在於民眾黨是否能推出具有全國知名度且能凝聚跨族群、跨階層支持的候選人。柯文哲的「醫師」、「白色力量」、「非藍綠」標籤過去確實吸引不少對傳統政治失望的選民，但若接班人無法創造類似吸引力，則總統之路將更加艱難。更別說在國民黨與民進黨逐漸穩固各自基本盤的情況下，第三勢力除非有重大社會運動或民怨激起的契機，否則將難以取得突破。

總結而言，柯文哲遭羈押與可能的重判讓民眾黨進入不確定階段。黃國昌雖具組織與監督能力，但是否能承接「政治明星」的角色仍存疑。若未能快速重建群眾支持與清晰政策路線，民眾黨極可能重演過去小黨式微的命運，但若能藉此重新塑造改革形象與與執政黨區隔，仍有一線突圍機會。

Ko Wen-je’s Detention Sends Shockwaves Through Taiwan People’s Party, Casting Doubt on Its Future

Ko Wen-je is currently under detention due to his alleged involvement in a corruption case, and the nature and trajectory of this case have delivered a significant blow to the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). As the party’s founder and symbolic leader, Ko’s personal image and legal troubles are intimately tied to the party’s viability and political positioning. Unlike former President Chen Shui-bian, who also faced legal charges in the past, Ko has never served as a head of state. Therefore, from both legal and constitutional perspectives, he cannot benefit from the protections afforded by Article 40 of the Constitution—unless granted a pardon by the ruling party. Given Ko’s longstanding tensions with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and his frequent public criticisms of the current administration, such a pardon appears highly unlikely under present political conditions.

In the wake of Ko’s political downfall, Huang Kuo-chang has taken over as chairman of the TPP, signaling a potential shift in the party’s core identity. Huang, who has a strong legal background and a reputation for fighting corruption, organized crime, and entrenched elites, first built his political capital through the New Power Party before consolidating his role within the TPP’s reformist faction. Under his leadership, the party may be able to maintain its role as an opposition watchdog in the short term. However, in the long run, if the TPP fails to cultivate a new leader with Ko’s level of charisma and media presence, its popular support could decline significantly.

Furthermore, Ko and Huang differ markedly in their political communication styles and issue focus. Ko excels in engaging with the public through relatable internet vernacular and grassroots appeal, whereas Huang emphasizes institutional oversight, legislative expertise, and anti-corruption efforts—topics that, while important, are often less emotionally resonant with voters during election cycles. If the TPP cannot swiftly devise new strategies or broaden its electoral base—currently concentrated among centrist and young voters—it risks becoming overly conservative and narrowly focused on single issues, potentially following in the footsteps of other once-prominent but now marginalized minor parties like the New Party or People First Party.

As for the TPP’s future prospects in presidential elections, much depends on whether the party can field a candidate with national recognition capable of rallying support across ethnic, social, and economic lines. Ko Wen-je’s unique appeal—embodied in his identity as a doctor, symbol of the “White Force,” and representative of a “non-blue, non-green” alternative—once attracted disillusioned voters from across the spectrum. Without a successor who can generate similar excitement, any future presidential bid will be significantly more difficult. Moreover, with the Kuomintang (KMT) and the DPP increasingly solidifying their respective bases, any third-party force will struggle to break through unless catalyzed by a major social movement or widespread public discontent.

In conclusion, Ko Wen-je’s detention and the possibility of a harsh sentence have thrown the TPP into a phase of uncertainty. While Huang Kuo-chang brings organizational discipline and a strong oversight focus, it remains to be seen whether he can step into the role of a political star. If the party fails to quickly rebuild mass support and establish a clear policy direction, it risks the same decline faced by past small parties. Nevertheless, if it can seize this moment to redefine its reformist identity and clearly distinguish itself from the ruling party, a path forward—albeit narrow—still exists.