伊朗的人口結構與內部撕裂：波斯人、阿塞拜疆人與美以關係的世紀博弈

伊朗，這個擁有八千萬人口的西亞大國，表面上是一個以伊斯蘭共和體制統一運作的國家，但其內部卻深藏劇烈的族群矛盾與政治裂痕。波斯人與阿塞拜疆人之間的權力競逐、親美與反美的意識形態對立、世俗與神權體制的持續拉鋸，共同構成了這個國家複雜而危險的政治生態。而近期以色列對伊朗高層的精準打擊——22名將領與9名核科學家被暗殺——更將伊朗權力核心的撕裂赤裸呈現在世人面前：波斯菁英正在祕密配合以色列，企圖推翻由阿塞拜疆人主導的神權統治。

伊朗是一個典型的多民族國家，但權力資源與政治地位的分配極其不均。表面上，波斯人約佔全國人口六成以上，理應是政治與文化的主體民族。然而，在伊斯蘭共和國的現實中，這一人口多數族群卻在軍政高層的代表性不到兩成，長期遭到邊緣化。波斯人曾是波斯帝國的繼承者，創造輝煌的古文明與語言文化，其語言至今仍為伊朗的官方語言。1979年前的巴列維王朝，正是由波斯菁英主導的親美世俗政權。

與此相對的，是佔比約16%至25%的阿塞拜疆人。這一族群主要分布於伊朗西北部，與北方的阿塞拜疆共和國語言文化相近，卻多數信奉什葉派伊斯蘭教。伊朗當今最高領袖哈梅內伊、已故最高領袖霍梅尼與現任總統賴希皆為阿塞拜疆裔，他們掌控伊斯蘭革命衛隊與司法體系，徹底重構伊朗的統治結構。阿塞拜疆人不僅在政治上壟斷權力，也主導極端反美、反以的對外政策，並持續對內鎮壓女性權利與世俗派聲音。

除了這兩大主體族群，伊朗還有如庫爾德人、阿拉伯人與俾路支人等被壓迫的少數民族。這些邊疆族群長期遭受種族與宗教的雙重歧視，庫爾德與俾路支地區時常爆發分離主義衝突。尤其是胡齊斯坦的阿拉伯人，儘管當地蘊藏豐富石油資源，卻面臨40%以上的貧困率，對政權的敵意日益高漲。

伊朗由親美轉向反美的劇烈外交轉變，其根本動因，實際上與族群權力的更替密切相關。巴列維王朝時代，波斯菁英與西方關係密切，不僅推動女性解放、教育自由與現代化建設，更與美國、以色列緊密結盟。當時的核計畫，正是由美國協助啟動，而以色列摩薩德則直接參與伊朗情報機構的訓練。

1979年，革命爆發。霍梅尼以反貪腐、反貧富不均的口號動員大眾，推翻波斯人的世俗政權，建立政教合一的伊斯蘭共和體制。革命後，波斯裔將領與法官遭大規模清洗，阿塞拜疆人迅速掌握軍隊與情報系統的實權。伊朗外交政策亦隨之大轉彎：美國由盟友變為「大撒旦」，以色列則從合作夥伴成為「必須抹除的癌細胞」。

時至今日，這個由阿塞拜疆人主導的政權，正以強硬手段維繫統治。革命衛隊壟斷超過六成的國民經濟資源，從石油、電信到地下走私網絡皆為其掌控，而普通民眾失業率卻超過50%。宗教高壓依舊：女性被強迫戴頭巾，波斯裔知識份子頻頻遭到拘捕，知識自由與文化多元幾近消失。外交上，伊朗大舉資助哈瑪斯與真主黨，將本可用於民生的資源投向地區代理戰爭。

2024年以來，以色列對伊朗的襲擊行動顯示出極高的情報準確性，每次行動都直指政權核心：從核設施爆炸，到無人機工廠被炸，再到革命衛隊高級將領連番遇刺。這些行動之所以能如此精準，背後其實藏著波斯菁英與以色列之間日益緊密的祕密合作。

據報導，許多被邊緣化的波斯裔軍官、科學家與外交人員，已組成地下情報網絡，向以色列摩薩德提供關鍵訊息。在2024年遇害的九名核科學家中，有六人即為波斯裔；而在被炸死的22名將領中，則有15人屬於由阿塞拜疆人主導的革命衛隊，波斯裔將領幾乎未受波及。這不僅反映出波斯人對神權政權的強烈不滿，也顯示他們正以「借刀殺人」的方式重啟自身在伊朗的歷史地位。

街頭輿論的變化也不容忽視。德黑蘭街頭流傳一句波斯諺語：「敵人的敵人，是暫時的朋友。」在2023年的反頭巾抗議中，民眾高喊：「不要加薩，不要黎巴嫩，只要伊朗。」這句口號直接質疑政權將國家資源投入他國戰爭的政策，也間接表露出對掌權阿塞拜疆集團的憤怒。

對以色列而言，這場內部裂解正提供一個「離岸平衡」的絕佳機會。透過削弱阿塞拜疆人掌控的政權，以色列得以延緩伊朗核計畫的進展，同時為未來可能出現的波斯人世俗政權鋪路。正如一位摩薩德前高官所言：「我們更願意看到一個由波斯人領導的、世俗化的伊朗。」

當前的伊朗，如同一座正在醞釀爆發的火山。以色列的打擊無異於在火山口拋下催化劑。阿塞拜疆集團面臨多重困境：貨幣里亞爾貶值超過五倍、青年失業率達60%、民間對外戰政策怨聲載道。而波斯人則迎來久違的政治契機：世俗派軍人與改革派教士（如拉夫桑賈尼家族）或將聯手，推動「去極端化」，改寫伊朗未來。

若美國拜登政府選擇放鬆制裁，或許將進一步鼓舞民間改朝換代的勇氣。一位德黑蘭大學社會學教授在匿名受訪時曾直言：「1979年的革命，是窮人反對富人；下一場革命，將是波斯人反對阿塞拜疆人。」

伊朗的悲劇，在於其反美反以政策早已偏離全民意志，而成為少數統治集團的意識形態工具。當波斯人選擇與曾經的「世仇」以色列合作，說明這個政權已然走到懸崖邊。

Iran’s Demographic Structure and Internal Fragmentation: Persians, Azerbaijanis, and the Century-Long US–Israel Geopolitical Chess

Iran, a major West Asian nation of some 80 million people, outwardly functions as a unified Islamic Republic. Yet beneath the surface lies a turbulent political landscape deepened by ethnic tensions between Persians and Azerbaijanis, ideological rifts between pro- and anti-American factions, and a persistent tug-of-war between secular and clerical rule. The recent precision strikes by Israel—killing 22 senior commanders and nine nuclear scientists—have cast this internal division into sharp relief: evidence suggests that Persia’s elite are clandestinely aiding Israel in an attempt to dismantle the current clerical regime dominated by Azerbaijanis.

Iran is a classic multi-ethnic state, but access to power and resources is profoundly uneven. Persians make up over 60% of the population and are traditionally regarded as the country’s cultural core. Their language, Persian (Farsi), remains Iran’s official tongue, and before the 1979 revolution, the Pahlavi dynasty—led by Persian elites—maintained close ties with the West. Yet today, Persians hold less than 20% of senior military and political posts within the Islamic Republic, effectively marginalized in the government they once led.

In contrast, Azerbaijanis—who comprise approximately 16–25% of the population—are clustered in Iran’s northwest and share linguistic and cultural affinities with the neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan, albeit as Shia Muslims. Iran’s current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and President Raisi are all Azerbaijani by descent. These officials have commandeered the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the judiciary, reshaping Iran’s power structure along ethnically aligned clerical lines. Under Azerbaijani leadership, the regime has adopted vehemently anti-American, anti-Israeli foreign policies while intensifying domestic repression of women’s rights and secular voices.

Beyond these major groups, Iran is home to other marginalized minorities—Kurds, Arabs, and Balochs—who experience double oppression based on ethnicity and religion. Kurdish and Baloch regions frequently see insurgent separatist activity, while Arabs in the oil-rich Khuzestan province suffer extraordinary poverty—with over 40% living below the poverty line—fuelling widespread resentment toward the central government.

Iran’s dramatic shift from an American ally to an anti-US pariah is closely tied to this ethnic power shift. During the Pahlavi era, Persian elites enthusiastically cooperated with the West, advancing modernization reforms—such as women’s liberation and co-educational universities—while forging alliances with the United States and Israel. The Iranian nuclear program itself began as the “Atoms for Peace” initiative under US sponsorship, and Mossad helped train intelligence operatives.

The 1979 revolution changed everything. Khomeini—a cleric of Azerbaijani origin—channeled popular disaffection with wealth disparity and corruption to overthrow the secular, pro-Western Pahlavi regime and usher in theocratic rule. In the aftermath, thousands of Persian officers and judges were purged, and Azerbaijanis consolidated control over the military and intelligence. Iran’s foreign policy reversed dramatically: the US transformed from ally to “Great Satan,” and Israel became a “cancer that must be eradicated.”

Today’s Azerbaijani-led regime wields power with a hard hand. The IRGC controls over 60% of Iran’s economy—from oil and telecommunications to underground smuggling—while unemployment hovers above 50%. Religious repression is rampant: women are compelled to wear hijab, Persian intellectuals are routinely detained, and cultural freedoms are severely restricted. Iran continues to fund Hamas and Hezbollah, allocating resources to regional conflict instead of domestic welfare.

Since 2024, Israeli strikes in Iran have demonstrated extraordinary precision, targeting core facilities—from nuclear plants and drone factories to IRGC command centers—revealing clandestine cooperation between Persian elites and Israeli intelligence. Reports suggest that displaced Persian officers, scientists, and diplomats have created underground networks funneling critical intelligence to Mossad. Of the nine nuclear scientists killed, six were reportedly Persian; of the 22 slain commanders, 15 were IRGC officers of Azerbaijani descent, while Persian military leaders were notably spared. These events illustrate Persian elite resentment and their tactical alignment with Israel to erode clerical Azerbaijani dominance.

Public sentiment in Tehran has shifted subtly. A Persian saying spreads through the streets: “The enemy of my enemy is a temporary friend.” In the 2023 anti-hijab protests, demonstrators chanted, “No Gaza, no Lebanon, only Iran,” directly criticizing the regime’s external spending and signaling growing disillusionment with the Azerbaijani leadership.

For Israel, this internal fissure offers a strategic offshore balance: by undermining the IRGC-dominated faction, Israel can both slow Iran’s nuclear progress and pave the way for a potential Persian-led, secular government. As one former Mossad official put it, “We’d prefer to see an Iran led by Persians—a secular Iran.”

Today, Iran resembles a pressure cooker nearing eruption, with Israeli intervention acting as the catalyst. The Azerbaijani faction faces existential challenges: a national currency devaluation exceeding 500%, youth unemployment around 60%, and soaring public disapproval of foreign adventurism. On the other side, Persian forces—potentially including secular military officers and reformist clerics like the Rafsanjani family—may coalesce toward a de-escalation of extremism and a new political paradigm.

Should the Biden administration relax sanctions, it may embolden grassroots demands for regime change. A sociology professor at the University of Tehran—speaking anonymously—observed, “The 1979 revolution was the poor against the wealthy; the next revolution will be Persians against Azerbaijanis.”

Conclusion: The Ethnic and Ideological Prison of Modern Theocracy

Iran’s tragedy lies in its anti‑US and anti‑Israeli ideology being driven not by genuine national consensus, but by a narrow ruling faction’s geopolitical agenda. The prospect of Persian collaboration with their erstwhile “arch-enemy” Israel underscores just how close this regime is to collapse. Perhaps soon Iran will undergo another revolution—this time, led by the Persian elite suppressed for over 45 years.