莎莎（SaSa）（SaSa International，股票代號：0178.HK）的興衰歷程，是香港零售產業與亞洲美妝市場變遷的縮影。自1978年創立於香港銅鑼灣以來，莎莎曾是亞洲最具代表性的美妝零售品牌之一，憑藉著獨特的經營模式與價格優勢，快速擴展至台灣、中國內地與東南亞等地，最盛時全球門市達265家。然而，短短十年間，這個品牌卻從巔峰走向衰退，2024年更宣布全面退出經營20年的台灣市場，象徵著一個時代的落幕。

莎莎的成功始於其「平行進口」策略。不同於傳統百貨通路，莎莎透過引進未經官方代理的「水貨」美妝品牌，以比市價低20%至30%的價格販售，成功吸引大量價格敏感的消費者。尤其在2003年中國開放港澳自由行後，莎莎一躍成為內地旅客來港的必逛店鋪，高峰時期，單一門市月營業額可達數百萬港元，其香港總部與銅鑼灣旗艦店更被視為旅遊與購物地標。

進入2000年代，莎莎開始國際化布局，先後進駐台灣、澳門、新加坡、馬來西亞及中國內地，迅速擴張門市規模與市場佔有率。到了2013年，年營收突破100億港元，站穩亞洲美妝霸主地位。然而，這段榮景並未持久。

2014年以後，莎莎面臨四大關鍵挑戰，業績連年下滑。首先是中國電商的迅猛崛起，淘寶、天貓國際、小紅書等平台讓消費者能直接購買海外美妝產品，傳統「代購」與「水貨」模式迅速失去吸引力。莎莎原本的最大優勢——價格與便利，頓時成為劣勢。再者，許多國際品牌（如蘭蔻、雅詩蘭黛）開始收回平行進口權，轉而強化官方通路，迫使莎莎發展自有品牌。但這些自有品牌缺乏認同度，消費者反應冷淡。

此外，2019年的香港社會運動與其後國安法實施，嚴重衝擊當地零售與觀光產業。自由行人潮銳減，使莎莎的香港業績幾乎腰斬。即使2023年香港重新通關，中國旅客的消費模式已顯著改變，不再大肆採購美妝產品。這導致莎莎失去其最大獲利來源。

在台灣市場，莎莎始終處於邊緣地位。無論在品牌定位還是行銷策略上皆模糊不清，既無法與百貨專櫃媲美，又難以與屈臣氏、康是美、寶雅等本土藥妝連鎖競爭。台灣消費者對其缺乏忠誠度與認同感，加上人力與門市成本偏高，使莎莎多年來幾無獲利。在不甘多年持續虧損後，集團最終決定全面撤出。

2025年3月，莎莎正式宣布關閉台灣所有21家門市，宣告其在地經營畫下句點。這一決策的背後，是連續六年虧損、營收僅剩高峰期20%的現實壓力，也是實體零售模式逐漸無法支撐成本的反映。隨著電商平台如momo、蝦皮的興起，台灣消費者的購物習慣已經改變，對實體門市的需求逐漸下降。莎莎未能及時轉型，只能選擇「斷尾求生」。

雖然莎莎將資源重新集中於中國內地與東南亞市場，但挑戰依然嚴峻。在中國，其門市規模已逐年縮減，面臨屈臣氏、絲芙蘭與本土電商的夾擊；在香港，自由行紅利不再、旅遊零售低迷；而轉型電商的努力起步過晚，難以在競爭激烈的平台生態中站穩腳步。儘管莎莎持續嘗試調整產品結構與經營模式，但截至目前，尚未找到能真正挽回業績的轉機。

莎莎的興衰，是香港零售業從「水貨經濟」邁向轉型陣痛的縮影。在那個尚未普及電商的年代，莎莎曾因應需求與政策紅利而崛起，然而當時代風向改變，它卻未能及時轉型，最終無法抵擋市場與制度變遷的雙重夾擊。今天的莎莎，已不再是昔日亞洲美妝王國的代名詞，而是留下一段商業傳奇與轉型警示。若未來仍無法成功重塑品牌與定位，莎莎恐怕將步上「卓悅」等同類型企業的後塵，逐漸淡出大眾視野。

The Rise and Fall of SaSa (SaSa International, Stock Code: 0178.HK) mirrors the transformation of Hong Kong's retail landscape and the evolving beauty market in Asia. Founded in 1978 in Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, SaSa grew to become one of Asia’s most iconic cosmetics retail brands. With a unique business model and competitive pricing, the company rapidly expanded into Taiwan, mainland China, and Southeast Asia. At its peak, SaSa operated 265 stores worldwide. However, within a decade, it fell into decline, culminating in its complete withdrawal from Taiwan in 2024—marking the end of an era.

SaSa’s early success was built upon a “parallel import” strategy. Instead of relying on traditional department store channels, it imported grey-market beauty products—brands not officially distributed in the region—and sold them at 20% to 30% below market price. This pricing strategy attracted a large customer base, especially after China’s 2003 introduction of the Individual Visit Scheme, which brought a flood of mainland tourists to Hong Kong. At its height, a single SaSa store could generate several million Hong Kong dollars in monthly revenue. Its flagship store in Causeway Bay became a symbol of both tourism and shopping in the city.

In the 2000s, SaSa accelerated its international expansion, entering markets such as Taiwan, Macau, Singapore, Malaysia, and mainland China. By 2013, its annual revenue had surpassed HKD 10 billion, solidifying its status as the top beauty retail empire in Asia. However, this prosperity was short-lived.

After 2014, SaSa began to face four critical challenges that led to years of declining performance. First was the explosive rise of China’s e-commerce platforms such as Taobao, Tmall Global, and Xiaohongshu, which allowed consumers direct access to overseas beauty products. This development rapidly eroded SaSa’s competitive edge in price and convenience. Second, many international brands—such as Lancôme and Estée Lauder—revoked parallel import rights and prioritized their own official distribution channels, forcing SaSa to pivot to private-label products that failed to resonate with consumers.

The third blow came from political and social upheaval. The 2019 Hong Kong protests and the subsequent implementation of the National Security Law devastated tourism and retail sectors. The drop in mainland visitors led to a steep decline in SaSa’s sales. Even when border controls eased in 2023, Chinese tourists had developed new shopping habits and no longer engaged in heavy cosmetics shopping, cutting off a major revenue stream for the company.

In Taiwan, SaSa never gained a solid foothold. Its branding and marketing were unclear—it couldn’t match the prestige of department store counters, nor could it compete with local chains like Watsons, Cosmed, or POYA. Taiwanese consumers lacked brand loyalty toward SaSa, and with high labor and store costs, its operations remained unprofitable. After years of financial loss, SaSa ultimately chose to exit the market entirely.

In March 2025, SaSa officially announced the closure of all 21 of its Taiwan stores, ending its presence in the region. This move was driven by six consecutive years of losses and a steep revenue drop to just 20% of its former peak. It was also a reflection of the rising costs of physical retail operations, which were no longer sustainable amid shifting consumer habits toward e-commerce platforms like momo and Shopee. SaSa failed to transform quickly enough and opted instead for a last-resort retreat.

Although SaSa has now redirected its focus to mainland China and Southeast Asia, the road ahead remains tough. In China, its store count is steadily shrinking, squeezed by competitors like Watsons, Sephora, and domestic e-commerce platforms. In Hong Kong, the end of free-travel tourism and sluggish retail recovery persist. Meanwhile, SaSa’s delayed entry into the e-commerce arena has made it difficult to gain traction against well-established players. Despite ongoing efforts to optimize its product structure and business model, the company has yet to find a viable path back to profitability.

SaSa’s rise and fall encapsulates the painful transition of Hong Kong’s retail sector from a “grey market” economy to one challenged by digital transformation. In the pre-e-commerce era, SaSa thrived by leveraging policy tailwinds and unmet market demand. But when those winds shifted, the company struggled to adapt. Once a symbol of Asia’s beauty retail dominance, SaSa now stands as both a business legend and a cautionary tale. Without successful brand reinvention and strategic repositioning, SaSa risks following in the footsteps of similar retailers like Bonjour, fading quietly from public memory.