香港銀行業近期面臨嚴重的不良貸款問題，顯示出其整體金融體系正處於前所未有的壓力之下。根據惠譽評級（Fitch Ratings）最新報告，截至2025年3月底，香港銀行業的不良貸款總額已飆升至250億美元，占整體貸款餘額的2%，創下近20年來的最高水準。預估到2025年底，這一比率可能升至2.3%，並成為亞太地區最嚴重的不良貸款比率之一。

造成這一局面的原因是多方面的，首先必須提到的是香港經濟的持續疲軟。受新冠疫情餘波、全球通脹衝擊、美中貿易緊張、以及本地政治社會環境不穩定等多重因素交織影響，香港經濟復蘇力道顯得非常薄弱。房地產市場作為香港經濟的重要支柱，近年來更是表現慘澹。住宅價格持續下滑、商用物業空置率攀升、租金回報率下降，使得大量與房地產相關的貸款變得風險更高，最終形成銀行系統中的不良資產。

此外，中小企業的財務狀況也不斷惡化。疫情後雖然政府推行各類紓困措施，但在高利率環境下，許多企業依然無力償還貸款。特別是在旅遊、零售與餐飲等行業，大量企業在營收未能恢復的背景下倒閉或陷入嚴重虧損，其貸款變為壞賬的風險驟增。

而利率政策的變化也進一步加劇銀行壓力。由於港元與美元掛鉤，香港利率緊隨美國加息步伐。高利率環境不僅壓抑房地產與消費市場的活力，也使借款成本大幅增加，令許多貸款人陷入“借新還舊”無門的困境。當企業和個人面對持續上升的利息負擔，其違約風險自然快速上升。

值得注意的是，中國大陸企業在香港的業務違約亦成為不良貸款上升的一個關鍵因素。近年中國大陸房地產龍頭企業接連違約、債務違約蔓延至港資銀行體系，形成跨境信貸風險。許多香港銀行在過去幾年對內地房地產與基建行業提供大量信貸支援，而如今這些資產的價值大幅縮水，使得貸款無法按時償還，成為新的風險來源。

面對不良貸款高企、信貸品質惡化的局面，香港金融管理當局和銀行界開始研議設立“壞賬銀行”（Bad Bank）的應對機制。壞賬銀行的設立，旨在將銀行體系內的高風險、不良資產剝離出來，由特定機構集中管理或處置，從而減輕銀行本身的資產負擔，恢復其正常放貸功能。這種機制在亞洲金融風暴及2008年金融危機後已有先例，例如馬來西亞的Danaharta或韓國的KAMCO，都是透過集中處理壞賬成功穩定金融系統的例子。

然而，這一方案在執行上也存在挑戰。如何界定哪些資產應轉入壞賬銀行、如何評估其殘值、以及由誰來承擔相關財政與管理成本，都是未來必須面對的問題。若處理不慎，不僅可能影響政府財政，也可能削弱市場對香港金融體系的信心。

總體而言，香港銀行業面臨的不良貸款問題並非短期現象，而是經濟結構性問題與外部環境壓力交疊之下的結果。在全球經濟復蘇緩慢、中國經濟轉型陣痛、地緣政治風險不斷升溫的背景下，香港金融體系正站在一個關鍵的轉捩點上。若無法有效處理壞賬問題，勢必會影響未來信貸投放、企業融資與整體經濟活力，對香港作為國際金融中心的地位構成嚴峻考驗。

Hong Kong's banking sector is currently facing a severe non-performing loan (NPL) crisis, reflecting unprecedented pressure on its overall financial system. According to the latest report by Fitch Ratings, as of the end of March 2025, the total amount of non-performing loans in Hong Kong’s banking industry had surged to USD 25 billion, accounting for 2% of total loans—marking the highest level in nearly 20 years. It is projected that this ratio could rise to 2.3% by the end of 2025, making it the highest in the Asia-Pacific region and possibly worsening further into 2026.

The causes behind this situation are multifaceted. Chief among them is Hong Kong’s prolonged economic weakness. The lingering impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, global inflationary pressures, tense U.S.-China trade relations, and the city’s own unstable sociopolitical environment have collectively undermined the strength of its economic recovery. The real estate market—historically a pillar of Hong Kong’s economy—has performed poorly in recent years. Declining housing prices, rising vacancy rates in commercial properties, and falling rental yields have rendered real estate-backed loans increasingly risky, eventually turning many of them into bad debts within the banking system.

In addition, the financial health of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has steadily deteriorated. Although the government introduced various relief measures post-pandemic, many businesses have struggled to repay loans in a high-interest-rate environment. This is particularly true in sectors such as tourism, retail, and food and beverage, where revenues have failed to rebound. Many companies have gone bankrupt or fallen into deep losses, dramatically increasing the risk of loan defaults.

Changes in interest rate policies have further compounded the pressure on banks. Due to the Hong Kong dollar’s peg to the U.S. dollar, Hong Kong has had to follow the U.S. Federal Reserve's interest rate hikes. This high interest rate environment has not only dampened activity in the real estate and consumer markets but also significantly increased borrowing costs. As a result, many borrowers have found themselves trapped, unable to refinance their loans or take on new credit to service existing debt. With the growing burden of interest payments, the risk of default among both businesses and individuals has surged sharply.

Another noteworthy factor is the surge in defaults by mainland Chinese companies operating in Hong Kong. In recent years, leading Chinese property developers have defaulted one after another, with debt crises spreading to Hong Kong-based banks, thereby creating cross-border credit risk. Many Hong Kong banks had provided extensive credit support to mainland real estate and infrastructure sectors in previous years. Now that the value of these assets has plummeted, many loans can no longer be repaid on time, adding a new source of risk to the system.

In light of the growing volume of bad loans and the overall deterioration of credit quality, Hong Kong’s financial regulators and banking sector are considering establishing a “bad bank” as a countermeasure. The purpose of this mechanism would be to separate high-risk, non-performing assets from the banking system and transfer them to a designated institution for centralized management or disposal. This would reduce the financial burden on banks and help restore normal lending functions. Similar mechanisms have been used successfully in the past, such as Malaysia’s Danaharta and South Korea’s KAMCO, both of which helped stabilize financial systems after the Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.

However, implementing such a plan presents challenges. Determining which assets should be transferred, how to evaluate their residual value, and who will bear the fiscal and administrative costs are all issues that must be addressed. Mishandling these elements could negatively impact public finances and weaken investor confidence in Hong Kong’s financial system.

Overall, the NPL crisis in Hong Kong’s banking sector is not merely a short-term fluctuation. It is the result of structural economic issues compounded by external pressures. Against the backdrop of a slow global recovery, China’s economic transformation pains, and escalating geopolitical risks, Hong Kong’s financial system stands at a critical crossroads. If the bad debt problem cannot be effectively resolved, it will inevitably affect future credit supply, corporate financing, and broader economic vitality, posing a serious threat to Hong Kong’s status as an international financial center.