1945年，日本無條件投降，結束對朝鮮半島長達三十五年的殖民統治。此後，美國與蘇聯進駐半島南北，實行短暫的分區軍事佔領。在南部，美國軍政府對半島內部自發形成的民主團體缺乏信任，同時也不信任流亡海外、長期領導抗日運動的大韓民國臨時政府。結果，美方選擇沿用大量日本殖民統治時期的舊朝鮮官僚來協助治理。這種人事安排使得戰後的韓國在政治觀念與社會運作上，未能徹底清算殖民時期的「親日」遺毒，「殖民史觀」仍然深植於社會之中，甚至出現美化日本統治、矮化朝鮮半島歷史的傾向。這樣的局面為韓國右派在戰後的存續提供了社會與政治基礎。

隨後數十年間，韓國史學界興起清除「殖民史觀」的運動。自1979年起，姜萬吉、崔章集等進步派學者耗時十年編纂出版《解放前後史的認識》，徹底重塑了韓國的歷史敘事。在他們主導的「進步史觀」影響下，韓國近現代史被重新定義為「追求民族獨立與統一的民族史」，以及「抵抗壓迫、向往自由的民眾史」。這樣的歷史視角，不僅針對日本帝國主義，也將韓國國內的軍事獨裁者與背後支持的美國納入批判對象。到20世紀80年代，進步史觀逐漸在韓國的歷史話語中取得優勢。

冷戰時期，韓國右派的存在主要依靠「反共」口號以及國家主導的經濟發展理論來維繫。但隨著冷戰結束、韓國民主化運動展開，右派傳統的政治論述逐漸失去號召力。而進步史觀的強勢，反過來讓右派背上「親日賣國」的包袱。在這樣的背景下，右派急需新的學術工具與價值體系，來建立符合時代的「歷史正義」。

「殖民地現代化論」正是在此時逐步浮現。該理論由安炳直、李榮薰等經濟學者在20世紀80年代提出，他們以經濟統計和實證研究為基礎，主張日本殖民統治為韓國現代化打下基礎，藉此挑戰以抗日獨立運動、反獨裁民主化運動和民族統一運動為核心的傳統民族史觀。雖然當時「殖民地現代化論」尚未成氣候，但它為日後的「新右派」思想提供了雛形。1987年成立的落星台經濟研究所，也成為這股思想的孕育場所。

進入1990年代後，韓國政壇逐漸形成進步與保守兩大陣營並立的格局，爭奪「歷史正義」的鬥爭愈演愈烈。進步史觀成為進步陣營的理論武器，而金大中、盧武鉉兩代進步政權更在政治、經濟與司法層面加強了對「親日派」的清算。這進一步壓縮了保守派的生存空間，也推動「新右派」勢力從學術圈走向政治舞台。

2004年，《東亞日報》政治部長李東官首次在文章中提出「新右派」概念，並積極宣傳這一思潮。隨後數年間，「自由主義連帶」「時代精神」「新右派全國聯合」等組織相繼成立，在2007年李明博當選總統的過程中發揮了顯著作用。此後，大批「新右派」人士進入國會與政府要職，「新右派」思想也逐步從經濟史拓展至政治、文化等領域，形成一套較完整的體系。然而，在史觀基調上，「新右派」依然以「殖民地現代化論」為核心。

2012年，朴槿惠當選總統，保守政權得以延續，但「新右派」卻逐漸式微。原因一方面在於朴槿惠與李明博分屬不同派系，對於與李明博關係密切的「新右派」缺乏支持；另一方面，朴槿惠的思想更偏向傳統右派，與強調經濟理論的「新右派」缺乏共鳴。自朴槿惠與文在寅輪流執政期間，多數「新右派」組織逐步停止活動，「新右派」的政治能量也隨之消散。

整體而言，韓國「新右派」的興起與衰落，映照出歷史敘事在韓國政治中的核心地位。從「親日」遺緒的爭議，到「殖民地現代化論」的激辯，再到進步與保守兩大陣營的拉鋸，歷史不僅是學術問題，更是韓國政治正當性的重要資源。

In 1945, with Japan’s unconditional surrender, its 35-year colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula came to an end. The peninsula was temporarily divided into zones of occupation, with the United States administering the South and the Soviet Union the North. In the South, the U.S. military government distrusted both grassroots democratic groups that had formed internally and the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea that had operated abroad. Instead, it chose to rely heavily on former Korean bureaucrats who had served under Japanese colonial administration. As a result, post-division South Korea neither purged these “pro-Japanese” remnants from its political system nor fully dismantled colonial legacies. A “colonial historical perspective” that glorified Japanese rule and belittled Korea’s historical agency persisted, providing the right-wing with a political and social foundation.

In the decades that followed, South Korean historians launched a movement to eliminate this colonial historical perspective. Beginning in 1979, progressive scholars such as Kang Man-gil and Choi Jang-jip spent ten years compiling and publishing Understanding of History Before and After Liberation, which fundamentally reshaped Korea’s historical narrative. Under their “progressive historiography,” modern Korean history was redefined as both a “national history of striving for independence and reunification” and a “people’s history of resisting oppression and aspiring for freedom.” This perspective positioned Japan’s imperialism as the enemy, but also identified military dictators and their American backers as targets of resistance. By the 1980s, this progressive view had gained significant influence in South Korea’s historical discourse.

During the Cold War, the South Korean right wing survived largely by appealing to anti-communism and promoting state-led economic development. However, as the Cold War ended and South Korea’s democratization advanced, these arguments lost their relevance. The dominance of progressive historiography further branded the right as “pro-Japanese traitors,” leaving conservatives in urgent need of new intellectual tools and a sense of historical “justice.”

This context gave rise to the “colonial modernization theory.” Developed in the 1980s by economists such as Ahn Byung-jik and Lee Young-hoon, this theory employed economic statistics and empirical analysis to argue that Japanese colonial rule laid the foundation for Korea’s modernization. By doing so, it sought to challenge the nationalist narrative centered on the anti-Japanese independence movement, the struggle against dictatorship, and efforts toward reunification. Although initially marginal, this approach laid the groundwork for what later became known as the “New Right.” The establishment of the Nakseongdae Institute of Economic Research in 1987 further incubated these ideas.

From the 1990s onward, South Korean politics evolved into a contest between progressive and conservative camps, intensifying the battle over historical legitimacy. Progressive historiography became the ideological weapon of the progressive camp, and the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun strengthened the purge of “pro-Japanese” elements in politics, law, and society. Faced with this disadvantage, conservatives rethought their positions, and the “New Right” gradually moved beyond academia into the political sphere.

In 2004, Lee Dong-kwan, then political editor of the Dong-A Ilbo, first coined the term “New Right” in an article and actively promoted the movement. Soon after, organizations such as “Liberal Solidarity,” “Zeitgeist,” and the “New Right National Union” were founded. These groups played a significant role in Lee Myung-bak’s successful 2007 presidential campaign. With his victory, many New Right figures entered the National Assembly and government, and the New Right expanded beyond economic history into politics, culture, and ideology, forming a comprehensive framework. Yet at its core, the New Right’s historiography continued to rest on the colonial modernization thesis.

However, after Park Geun-hye won the presidency in 2012, the New Right began to decline. Park and Lee Myung-bak belonged to different factions within the conservative camp, and Park was less favorable to figures closely associated with Lee. Moreover, Park’s worldview aligned more closely with traditional conservatism rather than the economic-historical emphasis of the New Right, making it difficult for the two to resonate. During the presidencies of Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in, most New Right organizations ceased activity, and the movement lost its momentum.

In sum, the rise and decline of South Korea’s New Right illustrates the central role of historical narratives in Korean politics. From lingering pro-Japanese influences to debates over colonial modernization, and from progressive dominance to conservative counter-narratives, history has functioned not only as an academic debate but as a vital source of political legitimacy.