2025年秋季，一個令人意外的消息在中國水果市場引起熱烈討論——曾經被譽為「貴族水果」的陽光玫瑰葡萄（Shine Muscat），如今在中國部分地區的零售價格竟跌至每斤僅6元人民幣。這個價格幾乎相當於普通青提的批發價，與幾年前動輒四五百元一斤的「天價葡萄」形象相比，簡直是「從雲端跌入泥土」，引發輿論對農業過熱投資與品種過度擴散的深思。

陽光玫瑰最早源自日本，是日本農研機構（農業・食品產業技術總合研究機構，NARO）於1973年啟動培育的長期專案。該品種歷經33年選育，直到2006年才正式註冊為新品種。其特徵極為突出：無籽、果皮爽脆可食、糖度高達15至20度，甜度甚至超越蜜瓜，幾乎完全消除傳統葡萄的酸味。這種甜中帶脆的全新口感，曾被譽為「葡萄革命」，讓日本民眾驚嘆不已。

由於品種稀有且培育難度高，陽光玫瑰在日本自誕生以來一直是高價水果的代表。即使在2025年的今天，日本超市的售價仍維持在每斤160至200元台幣幣之間，而在高級百貨商店或精品果物店中，更是動輒每斤四五百元。日本岡山縣農協甚至設立了「晴王（はれおう）」品牌認證制度，僅限糖度達18度以上、單顆重量超過15克且外形完美的果串才能掛上「晴王」之名，堪稱「葡萄中的愛馬仕」。

然而，陽光玫瑰的中國故事卻走向完全不同的方向。由於日本當初在登記品種保護時僅在國內申請品種權，並未將保護範圍擴及海外，導致該品種的枝條、苗木在之後十多年間被引入中國大陸、韓國及東南亞地區，並迅速在華北、雲南、四川、山東等地被大量繁殖種植。中國農戶憑藉低成本的土地與勞動力優勢，加上適宜氣候條件，使得陽光玫瑰的種植面積在短短數年間呈爆炸式增長。

剛引入時，陽光玫瑰仍是「致富神話」的代名詞。2019年前後，每斤價格普遍在350至500元之間，精品果甚至能賣到1200元以上。無數果農、投資者蜂擁而入，有人砸下數百萬元建立溫室基地，期望藉此一夜暴富。然而，隨著市場供應過剩、品質良莠不齊、銷售管道混亂，到2025年，全國各地的陽光玫瑰幾乎「爛大街」。河南、山東、重慶等地出現大量滯銷現象，果農紛紛在社交平台上哀嘆：「沒人要的陽光玫瑰，只能當飼料賣」。

目前市場價格呈現極端分化：低端果園出產的陽光玫瑰一斤僅售6至12元；中等品質的約32至80元；而精品級（如控產、冷棚或進口苗栽培）的產品仍能賣到上百元。這種從「百元神話」跌至「斤斤計較」的反差，被媒體形容為「最短命的高價水果」。

與此同時，日本仍禁止進口中國種植的陽光玫瑰，以維持本國品牌的純度與價值，這也使得日本市場的價格依然居高不下。日本消費者將其視為奢侈果物，常被用於製作高級甜品，如陽光玫瑰蛋糕、慕斯、大福、水果三明治與飲品等，甚至成為高端禮盒市場的固定主角。

而在中國，陽光玫瑰的「神話破滅」也揭示一個更深層的問題——當熱錢與短期投機湧入農業領域，沒有品牌管理與品質控制的情況下，任何高價品種都可能被快速消耗殆盡。這場從「果王」到「白菜價」的戲劇性轉折，不僅是一個農產品供需失衡的縮影，更是一堂關於農業產業化、品種保護與知識產權意識的現實課程。

如今的陽光玫瑰，雖然在價格上「親民」到人人可負擔，但它背後的故事，卻是關於市場泡沫、農業結構、品牌文化與科技保護的集體反思。

In the autumn of 2025, a surprising development in China’s fruit market stirred intense public discussion — the once-luxurious Shine Muscat grapes, known as the “aristocrat of fruits,” saw their retail price in some regions plummet to as low as 6 RMB per jin (about 0.8 USD per pound). This price, roughly equivalent to that of common green grapes, marked a dramatic fall from their former “sky-high” reputation, when a single bunch could sell for hundreds of yuan. The incident sparked a broader reflection on overheated agricultural investment and the unchecked expansion of premium crop varieties.

Shine Muscat originated in Japan, developed by the country’s National Agriculture and Food Research Organization (NARO). The breeding project began in 1973 and took 33 years before the variety was officially registered in 2006. It was hailed as a “grape revolution,” featuring seedless fruit, crisp edible skin, and a remarkably high sugar content of 15–20 degrees Brix — even sweeter than melon, with almost no acidity. This new texture and sweetness made it an instant sensation in Japan.

Because of its cultivation difficulty and limited supply, Shine Muscat long maintained its elite status in Japan. Even today, it sells for 160–200 TWD per jin in regular supermarkets, and up to 400–500 TWD in luxury fruit boutiques. The JA Okayama cooperative even established the “Shine Muscat King” (晴王, Hare-Ō) certification, reserved for grapes exceeding 18° Brix, weighing over 15 grams each, and displaying perfect visual form — earning it the nickname “the Hermès of grapes.”

However, the story unfolded quite differently in China. When Japan registered the Shine Muscat variety, it only applied for domestic intellectual property protection and did not extend it overseas. As a result, vines and seedlings were later introduced to China, South Korea, and parts of Southeast Asia. In China, farmers quickly embraced the grape, taking advantage of lower production costs, abundant land, and favorable climate conditions. Within just a few years, Shine Muscat cultivation expanded explosively across provinces like Shandong, Yunnan, Henan, and Sichuan.

Initially, the grape symbolized a path to wealth. Around 2019, prices hovered between 350 and 500 RMB per jin, with premium fruit fetching up to 1,200 RMB. Farmers and investors rushed in, building greenhouses and hoping for overnight success. But as supply ballooned, quality became inconsistent, and sales channels chaotic, the market crashed. By 2025, Shine Muscat grapes were so overproduced that many farmers found themselves unable to sell them at all — some even resorted to using the fruit as animal feed. Social media was flooded with laments like “No one wants Shine Muscat anymore.”

Today, market prices vary drastically: low-grade grapes sell for 6–12 RMB per jin, mid-grade for 30–80 RMB, and only top-tier or carefully controlled greenhouse products still fetch over 100 RMB. The media has described this transformation — from a “hundred-yuan legend” to a “penny-per-pound fruit” — as “the fastest fall from luxury to ordinary in fruit history.”

Meanwhile, Japan continues to ban imports of Shine Muscat grapes grown in China to preserve the purity and prestige of its domestic brand. In Japan, the fruit remains a symbol of refinement, used in luxury desserts such as Shine Muscat cakes, daifuku, fruit sandwiches, and premium gift boxes.

In contrast, China’s Shine Muscat collapse has exposed deeper structural issues in its agricultural industry — particularly the dangers of speculative investment without brand management, quality control, or intellectual property awareness. The fall of Shine Muscat is not merely an agricultural story, but a cautionary tale about market bubbles, industrial strategy, and the fragile balance between innovation and imitation.

Though Shine Muscat has now become an affordable everyday fruit in China, its journey from “the king of grapes” to “bargain-bin produce” stands as a vivid lesson in market dynamics, agricultural policy, and the importance of sustainable brand cultivation.