2025年10月，美國與英國聯手對柬埔寨太子集團（Prince Group）主席陳志（Chen Zhi）提出訴訟並實施制裁，揭開東南亞規模最大的跨境洗錢網絡。隨著案件深入調查，一個鮮為人知的事實浮出水面：新加坡成為這一龐大洗錢體系的重要中轉站，尤其是通過所謂的家族辦公室（family office, 簡稱家辦）和多層殼公司，陳志得以實現資金漂白與形象洗白。美國媒體將這種現象稱為“Singapore washing”——利用新加坡金融聲譽與稅務制度，為跨國犯罪提供合法外衣。

據多家國際媒體及美國財政部資料披露，陳志及其團隊在新加坡的操作模式極具系統性與隱蔽性。他們以新加坡家辦DW Capital Holdings Pte. Ltd.為核心，聲稱管理資產逾6,000萬新元，享有13X稅收激勵，但並未持有資本市場服務（CMS）牌照。雖然新加坡金融管理局（MAS）已對該公司是否違規展開調查，但截至目前尚未公佈任何調查結果或處罰。專家指出，若家辦僅管理自家資金，根據現行規範可在豁免條件下不持牌，而13X激勵屬於稅務優惠，並非金融監管許可。

更引人注目的是，陳志在新加坡設立十餘家“管理諮詢/控股”公司，其中14家註冊在同一位址——紅山2 Jalan Kilang Barat大樓，被外界認為是資金流轉與代持的核心節點。這些公司包括DW Capital（家辦核心）、Skyline Investment Management（理財/借貸外殼，以車貸掩護資金流）、Warpcapital Yacht Management及Capital Zone Warehousing（透過遊艇與高端烈酒倉儲轉移資產）等。紅山辦公空間甚至配有雪茄吧、KTV及酒窖，看似創業基地，實則金融掩體，被認定為洗錢活動的節點。

此外，陳志的操作還依賴所謂的“家辦三人組”——三名新加坡籍前臺操盤手，他們負責資金流轉與日常管理。2025年10月14日，三人被列入美國財政部的SDN List，資產被凍結，美國公民禁止與其交易。這一行動表明，美英聯合制裁不僅針對陳志個人，也延伸至其在新加坡的核心運作團隊。此案也被視為對新加坡金融體系的一次壓力測試。事件暴露出新加坡家辦監管的真空，以及高度信任制度帶來的雙刃效應：一方面吸引真正的合法資本，另一方面也為灰色資金提供便利。如今，新加坡正加速修補制度漏洞，提速審批流程，強化盡職調查（due diligence）要求，力求在“吸引真資本”與“拒絕灰資金”之間取得平衡。

整體而言，太子集團案不僅揭示東南亞跨境洗錢的複雜網絡，也暴露了新加坡金融市場在國際監管壓力下的脆弱面向。從陳志利用家辦與殼公司掩護非法資金，到美英聯合制裁的快速反應，整個事件成為國際金融監管與家辦制度之間的一次重要考驗，也為全球防範跨境洗錢提供警示。

In October 2025, the United States and the United Kingdom jointly filed lawsuits and imposed sanctions against Chen Zhi, chairman of Cambodia’s Prince Group, unveiling one of the largest cross-border money laundering networks in Southeast Asia. As the investigation unfolded, a lesser-known but critical fact emerged: Singapore served as a key hub for the group’s laundering operations, particularly through family offices and layers of shell companies. Chen Zhi leveraged these structures to launder both funds and personal reputation, a practice that U.S. media have dubbed “Singapore washing”—using Singapore’s financial credibility and tax framework to cloak illicit activity in legitimacy.

According to multiple international media reports and U.S. Treasury documents, Chen Zhi’s team orchestrated highly systematic and opaque operations in Singapore. At the center was the family office DW Capital Holdings Pte. Ltd., which publicly claimed to manage over SGD 60 million in assets and benefit from a 13X tax incentive. However, the company did not hold a Capital Markets Services (CMS) license. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has reportedly launched an investigation into whether DW Capital violated regulatory requirements, but no conclusions or penalties have been publicly disclosed. Experts note that if a family office manages solely its own wealth, it may be exempt from licensing requirements, and the 13X incentive is a tax benefit rather than a financial regulatory approval.

Beyond DW Capital, Chen Zhi established over a dozen “management consulting or holding” companies in Singapore. Notably, 14 of these companies were registered at a single address—2 Jalan Kilang Barat in Redhill, seen as a core node for fund flows and nominee arrangements. These entities include DW Capital (core family office), Skyline Investment Management (a financial/loan shell disguised as auto lending), Warpcapital Yacht Management, and Capital Zone Warehousing (used to transfer assets via yachts and high-end liquor storage). The Redhill office space even features a cigar lounge, KTV, and wine cellar—appearing as a startup hub but functioning as a financial façade for laundering activities.

Chen’s operations also relied on a so-called “family office trio”—three Singaporean front executives responsible for daily management and fund operations. On October 14, 2025, all three were added to the U.S. Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, freezing their assets and prohibiting U.S. persons from transacting with them. This demonstrates that the U.S.-UK sanctions targeted not only Chen personally but also his core operational team in Singapore.

The case has been widely regarded as a stress test of Singapore’s financial system, revealing gaps in family office oversight and the dual-edged nature of high-trust financial structures: while attracting legitimate capital, they can also facilitate grey-area or illicit funds. In response, Singapore has accelerated regulatory reforms, streamlined approval processes, and strengthened due diligence requirements, seeking a careful balance between “welcoming real capital” and “blocking illicit funds.”

Overall, the Prince Group case exposes the complexity of cross-border money laundering in Southeast Asia and highlights vulnerabilities in Singapore’s financial ecosystem under international regulatory pressure. From Chen Zhi’s use of family offices and shell companies to shield illicit wealth, to the rapid U.S.-UK sanctions, the case serves as a significant cautionary tale for global anti-money laundering efforts and the oversight of family office structures.